IntEQ:通过跨多个精度的等价性检查来识别良性整数溢出

Hao Sun, X. Zhang, Yunhui Zheng, Qingkai Zeng
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引用次数: 15

摘要

整数溢出(IO)漏洞可以被攻击者利用来破坏计算机系统。与此同时,程序员可以有意地将IOs用于一些良性目的,如散列和随机数生成。因此,区分可利用的和有害的IOs与有意的和良性的IOs是一个重要的挑战。它可以减少IO漏洞检测技术产生的误报数量,帮助开发人员或安全分析师专注于修复关键的IOs,而无需检查大量的假警报。识别良性IOs的困难主要在于从源代码推断程序员的意图。在本文中,我们提出了一种通过跨多个精度的等效性检查来识别良性io的新技术。我们通过比较溢出的整数算术运算在实际世界(精度有限)和理想世界(具有足够的精度以逃避IO)中的效果来确定IO是否良性。具体来说,我们首先从溢出的整数算术运算中提取数据流路径到与安全相关的程序点(即接收器),然后使用更精确的类型(具有足够的位来表示整数)创建路径的新版本,以便可以避免IO。使用定理证明,我们检查这两个版本是否等价,也就是说,如果它们在所有可能的输入下产生相同的值。如果是,则IO是良性的。我们基于GCC编译器和Z3求解器实现了一个名为IntEQ的原型,并使用来自20个真实世界程序的26个有害IO漏洞和来自SPECINT 2000、SPECINT 2006和7个真实世界应用程序的444个良性IO漏洞对其进行了评估。实验结果表明,IntEQ不会对任何有害的IO错误进行错误分类(没有假阴性),并且在444个良性IOs中识别出355个(约79.95%),而目前的技术只能识别出19个良性IOs。
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IntEQ: Recognizing Benign Integer Overflows via Equivalence Checking across Multiple Precisions
Integer overflow (IO) vulnerabilities can be exploited by attackers to compromise computer systems. In the meantime, IOs can be used intentionally by programmers for benign purposes such as hashing and random number generation. Hence, differentiating exploitable and harmful IOs from intentional and benign ones is an important challenge. It allows reducing the number of false positives produced by IO vulnerability detection techniques, helping developers or security analysts to focus on fxing critical IOs without inspecting the numerous false alarms. The difficulty of recognizing benign IOs mainly lies in inferring the intent of programmers from source code. In this paper, we present a novel technique to recognize benign IOs via equivalence checking across multiple precisions. We determine if an IO is benign by comparing the effects of an overflowed integer arithmetic operation in the actual world (with limited precision) and the same operation in the ideal world (with sufficient precision to evade the IO). Specifically, we first extract the data flow path from the overflowed integer arithmetic operation to a security-related program point (i.e., sink) and then create a new version of the path using more precise types with sufficient bits to represent integers so that the IO can be avoided. Using theorem proving we check whether these two versions are equivalent, that is, if they yield the same values at the sink under all possible inputs. If so, the IO is benign. We implement a prototype, named IntEQ, based on the GCC compiler and the Z3 solver, and evaluate it using 26 harmful IO vulnerabilities from 20 real-world programs, and 444 benign IOs from SPECINT 2000, SPECINT 2006, and 7 real-world applications. The experimental results show that IntEQ does not misclassify any harmful IO bugs (no false negatives) and recognizes 355 out of 444 (about 79.95%) benign IOs, whereas the state of the art can only recognize 19 benign IOs.
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