Cultural Capture of Competition Policy: Exploring the Risk in the US and the EU

This article explores whether there is a risk that competition policy on both sides of the Atlantic could be distorted by cultural capture. This type of capture differs from traditional regulatory capture operating through self-interest of public officials. It instead arises when policy-relevant views of the officials are subject to disproportionate social influence exerted by representatives of the private sector. The question here is hence whether social interactions enabling this influence take place between competition officials and practitioners. The article answers in the affirmative, finding that many competition officials seem to self-identify with a community dominated by competition practitioners, hold the practitioners in high regard, and have interpersonal relationships with the practitioners. These risk factors are especially pronounced in the United States. There is thus a possibility that competition policy could be designed and enforced in a way that furthers interests of big business to the detriment of consumers and small businesses. The article also discusses preventive measures to limit cultural capture of competition policy such as promotion of diversity and reduction of revolving door, cautioning nevertheless that difficult trade-offs may need to be made in their implementation. agency independence, anti-interventionism, competition community, competition policy, cultural capture, Antitrust Division, DG Competition, Bureau of Competition, regulatory capture, revolving door, social influence