{"title":"对党外人士言论自由的容忍","authors":"R. Carlos, Geoffrey Sheagley, Karlee L. Taylor","doi":"10.1017/S1049096522001202","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Americans consistently express broad levels of support for free speech and free expression. For example, 87% of respondents in a recent survey reported that freedom of speech is “very” or “extremely” personally important (Knight Foundation 2022). Moreover, this support seemingly transcends party lines, with 91% of Republicans and 88% of Democrats endorsing this importance.1 Yet, there are reasons to be skeptical that broad levels of support translate to on-theground tolerance of free speech. There are numerous historical examples of Americans’ willingness to selectively withdraw First Amendment protections to those deemed undeserving, particularly along racial, ethnic, and ideological dimensions (King and Smith 2005). Additionally, people are far less likely to tolerate and extend rights to members of their “least-liked” group, especially when threatened (Lambert and Chasteen 1997; Marcus et al. 1995; McClosky and Chong 1985; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). Therefore, we are left to wonder what to make of these strong endorsements that Americans continue to give regarding First Amendment protections. One reason to be skeptical about these declarations of support for free speech is that these endorsements lack tradeoffs and are socially desirable. These low-stakes features could inflate levels of overall public support for civil rights protections. In practice, however, questions related to rights typically do not ask whether a constitutionally protected right should exist. Instead, debates often center on the scope of those rights and/or the groups to whom those protections extend. Creating an additional complication is that beliefs about freedom of speech—and other related rights—can be politicized along partisan lines. Democrats and Republicans could differ significantly in defining First Amendment rights and the values they attach to them based on the object they seek to defend. For example, the previously cited Knight Foundation (2022) report noted that partisans differ substantially in their belief about whether spreading misinformation or hate speech online should be a protected form of speech. To test the limits of Americans’ commitment to free speech, we relied on two survey experiments that were designed expressly to assess whether broad commitments to speech change when tradeoffs or costs to that speech are introduced, as well as whether those speech protections extend to partisan groups. The first experiment focused on broad support for free speech; the second concerned views of free speech on college campuses. The studies yielded four broad conclusions: (1) in the absence of tradeoffs, support for free speech was high; (2) Republicans expressed greater support for free speech than Democrats; (3) the introduction of tradeoffs altered support for free speech and did so similarly for Democrats and Republicans; and (4) support for free speech did not depend on whether partisan in-groups or out-groups engaged in the speech. The survey experiments were included in the Knight Foundation–Ipsos Study from the Knight Free Expression Research Series (Knight Foundation 2022). This was an omnibus project that convened teams of scholars who were interested in studying questions related to Americans’ views of free speech and expression. The survey was nationally representative and also included an oversample of nonwhite adults and college students. The experiments described in this article included approximately 2,500 participants (Carlos, Sheagley, and Taylor 2022).2","PeriodicalId":48096,"journal":{"name":"Ps-Political Science & Politics","volume":"45 1","pages":"240 - 244"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Tolerance for the Free Speech of Outgroup Partisans\",\"authors\":\"R. Carlos, Geoffrey Sheagley, Karlee L. Taylor\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/S1049096522001202\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Americans consistently express broad levels of support for free speech and free expression. For example, 87% of respondents in a recent survey reported that freedom of speech is “very” or “extremely” personally important (Knight Foundation 2022). Moreover, this support seemingly transcends party lines, with 91% of Republicans and 88% of Democrats endorsing this importance.1 Yet, there are reasons to be skeptical that broad levels of support translate to on-theground tolerance of free speech. There are numerous historical examples of Americans’ willingness to selectively withdraw First Amendment protections to those deemed undeserving, particularly along racial, ethnic, and ideological dimensions (King and Smith 2005). Additionally, people are far less likely to tolerate and extend rights to members of their “least-liked” group, especially when threatened (Lambert and Chasteen 1997; Marcus et al. 1995; McClosky and Chong 1985; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). Therefore, we are left to wonder what to make of these strong endorsements that Americans continue to give regarding First Amendment protections. One reason to be skeptical about these declarations of support for free speech is that these endorsements lack tradeoffs and are socially desirable. These low-stakes features could inflate levels of overall public support for civil rights protections. In practice, however, questions related to rights typically do not ask whether a constitutionally protected right should exist. Instead, debates often center on the scope of those rights and/or the groups to whom those protections extend. Creating an additional complication is that beliefs about freedom of speech—and other related rights—can be politicized along partisan lines. Democrats and Republicans could differ significantly in defining First Amendment rights and the values they attach to them based on the object they seek to defend. For example, the previously cited Knight Foundation (2022) report noted that partisans differ substantially in their belief about whether spreading misinformation or hate speech online should be a protected form of speech. To test the limits of Americans’ commitment to free speech, we relied on two survey experiments that were designed expressly to assess whether broad commitments to speech change when tradeoffs or costs to that speech are introduced, as well as whether those speech protections extend to partisan groups. The first experiment focused on broad support for free speech; the second concerned views of free speech on college campuses. The studies yielded four broad conclusions: (1) in the absence of tradeoffs, support for free speech was high; (2) Republicans expressed greater support for free speech than Democrats; (3) the introduction of tradeoffs altered support for free speech and did so similarly for Democrats and Republicans; and (4) support for free speech did not depend on whether partisan in-groups or out-groups engaged in the speech. The survey experiments were included in the Knight Foundation–Ipsos Study from the Knight Free Expression Research Series (Knight Foundation 2022). This was an omnibus project that convened teams of scholars who were interested in studying questions related to Americans’ views of free speech and expression. The survey was nationally representative and also included an oversample of nonwhite adults and college students. The experiments described in this article included approximately 2,500 participants (Carlos, Sheagley, and Taylor 2022).2\",\"PeriodicalId\":48096,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ps-Political Science & Politics\",\"volume\":\"45 1\",\"pages\":\"240 - 244\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ps-Political Science & Politics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096522001202\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ps-Political Science & Politics","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096522001202","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
美国人一贯对言论自由和表达自由表示广泛的支持。例如,在最近的一项调查中,87%的受访者表示,言论自由对个人来说“非常”或“极其”重要(Knight Foundation 2022)。此外,这种支持似乎超越了党派界限,91%的共和党人和88%的民主党人都赞同这一重要性然而,我们有理由怀疑,广泛的支持能否转化为对言论自由的实际容忍。历史上有很多例子表明,美国人愿意有选择地撤销第一修正案对那些被认为不值得保护的人的保护,特别是在种族、民族和意识形态方面(King and Smith 2005)。此外,人们不太可能容忍和扩大他们“最不喜欢”群体成员的权利,特别是当受到威胁时(Lambert和Chasteen 1997;Marcus et al. 1995;McClosky and Chong 1985;Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley, 1997)。因此,我们想知道,美国人继续对第一修正案的保护给予的这些强烈支持是什么。对这些支持言论自由的声明持怀疑态度的一个原因是,这些支持缺乏权衡,而且是社会所希望的。这些低风险的特征可能会提高公众对民权保护的总体支持水平。然而,在实践中,与权利有关的问题通常不会询问受宪法保护的权利是否应该存在。相反,辩论往往集中在这些权利的范围和/或这些保护所涵盖的群体上。更复杂的是,关于言论自由和其他相关权利的信仰可以沿着党派路线被政治化。民主党人和共和党人在定义第一修正案的权利以及根据他们寻求捍卫的对象赋予这些权利的价值观方面可能存在很大差异。例如,之前引用的奈特基金会(2022)报告指出,对于在网上传播错误信息或仇恨言论是否应受到保护,党派之间的看法存在很大差异。为了测试美国人对言论自由的承诺的限度,我们依靠了两个调查实验,这两个实验是专门设计来评估当言论的权衡或成本被引入时,对言论的广泛承诺是否会改变,以及这些言论保护是否延伸到党派团体。第一个实验的重点是对言论自由的广泛支持;第二个问题涉及对大学校园言论自由的看法。这些研究得出了四个广泛的结论:(1)在没有权衡的情况下,对言论自由的支持很高;(2)共和党人比民主党人更支持言论自由;(3)权衡的引入改变了对言论自由的支持,对民主党和共和党的支持也是如此;(4)对言论自由的支持并不取决于党派内部团体或外部团体是否参与了演讲。调查实验被纳入Knight Foundation - ipsos Study (Knight Foundation 2022),奈特自由表达研究系列。这是一个综合性的项目,召集了一批对研究美国人对言论和表达自由的看法相关问题感兴趣的学者。这项调查具有全国代表性,还包括非白人成年人和大学生的抽样调查。本文中描述的实验包括大约2500名参与者(Carlos, Sheagley, and Taylor 2022)
Tolerance for the Free Speech of Outgroup Partisans
Americans consistently express broad levels of support for free speech and free expression. For example, 87% of respondents in a recent survey reported that freedom of speech is “very” or “extremely” personally important (Knight Foundation 2022). Moreover, this support seemingly transcends party lines, with 91% of Republicans and 88% of Democrats endorsing this importance.1 Yet, there are reasons to be skeptical that broad levels of support translate to on-theground tolerance of free speech. There are numerous historical examples of Americans’ willingness to selectively withdraw First Amendment protections to those deemed undeserving, particularly along racial, ethnic, and ideological dimensions (King and Smith 2005). Additionally, people are far less likely to tolerate and extend rights to members of their “least-liked” group, especially when threatened (Lambert and Chasteen 1997; Marcus et al. 1995; McClosky and Chong 1985; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). Therefore, we are left to wonder what to make of these strong endorsements that Americans continue to give regarding First Amendment protections. One reason to be skeptical about these declarations of support for free speech is that these endorsements lack tradeoffs and are socially desirable. These low-stakes features could inflate levels of overall public support for civil rights protections. In practice, however, questions related to rights typically do not ask whether a constitutionally protected right should exist. Instead, debates often center on the scope of those rights and/or the groups to whom those protections extend. Creating an additional complication is that beliefs about freedom of speech—and other related rights—can be politicized along partisan lines. Democrats and Republicans could differ significantly in defining First Amendment rights and the values they attach to them based on the object they seek to defend. For example, the previously cited Knight Foundation (2022) report noted that partisans differ substantially in their belief about whether spreading misinformation or hate speech online should be a protected form of speech. To test the limits of Americans’ commitment to free speech, we relied on two survey experiments that were designed expressly to assess whether broad commitments to speech change when tradeoffs or costs to that speech are introduced, as well as whether those speech protections extend to partisan groups. The first experiment focused on broad support for free speech; the second concerned views of free speech on college campuses. The studies yielded four broad conclusions: (1) in the absence of tradeoffs, support for free speech was high; (2) Republicans expressed greater support for free speech than Democrats; (3) the introduction of tradeoffs altered support for free speech and did so similarly for Democrats and Republicans; and (4) support for free speech did not depend on whether partisan in-groups or out-groups engaged in the speech. The survey experiments were included in the Knight Foundation–Ipsos Study from the Knight Free Expression Research Series (Knight Foundation 2022). This was an omnibus project that convened teams of scholars who were interested in studying questions related to Americans’ views of free speech and expression. The survey was nationally representative and also included an oversample of nonwhite adults and college students. The experiments described in this article included approximately 2,500 participants (Carlos, Sheagley, and Taylor 2022).2
期刊介绍:
PS: Political Science & Politics provides critical analyses of contemporary political phenomena and is the journal of record for the discipline of political science reporting on research, teaching, and professional development. PS, begun in 1968, is the only quarterly professional news and commentary journal in the field and is the prime source of information on political scientists" achievements and professional concerns. PS: Political Science & Politics is sold ONLY as part of a joint subscription with American Political Science Review and Perspectives on Politics.