生命周期下的闭环供应链运营决策:生态设计、服务设计和回收努力视角

IF 1.8 4区 管理学 Q3 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE Rairo-Operations Research Pub Date : 2023-07-18 DOI:10.1051/ro/2023106
Shan Liu, Caiquan Duan, Jinyou Qiao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

闭环供应链(CLSC)的商业、环境和社会价值已在文献中得到广泛认可。企业越来越意识到产品生命周期管理的重要性;即企业对产品的生产、使用和回收进行CLSC管理。现有研究缺乏对产品全生命周期下CLSC运营决策的研究。本文将生态设计、服务设计和循环利用引入到具有制造商、零售商和回收商的CLSC中。利用博弈论构建了考虑不同领导结构和服务设计提供者的Stackelberg模型,并采用逆向归纳法求解了不同情况下的博弈。结果表明,从系统运行效率和总利润最大化的角度来看,回收商主导的模式总是最有效的。然而,对于最优服务设计提供者的选择,当制造商(零售商)是领导者时,提供服务设计的零售商(制造商)应该是优势策略。当回收商是领导者时,无论谁提供服务设计,效果都是一样的。最后,我们发现了一个有趣的结论,在零售商提供服务设计的情况下,供应链成员在自己的领导结构下并不总是获得最高的利润。数值分析表明,当消费者对服务设计的偏好大于6.3时,制造商在回收者主导结构下可以获得更大的利润;当消费者对生态设计的偏好大于7.1时,零售商在回收者主导结构下可以获得更多的利润。
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A closed-loop supply chain operation decision under life cycle: Ecological design, service design and recycling effort perspectives
The commercial, environmental and social value of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) has been widely recognised in the literature. Enterprises are increasingly aware of the importance of product life cycle management; that is, enterprises conduct CLSC management of the production, use and recycling of products. Existing research lacks research on CLSC operation decision under product life cycle. This paper introduces ecological design, service design and recycling into a CLSC with the manufacturer, retailer and recycler. Stackelberg models considering different leadership structures and service design providers are constructed using game theory, and we use backward induction to solve the game in different cases. Results show that from the system-operating efficiency and total profits maximisation perspectives, the recycler-led is always the most effective. However, for the selection of the optimal service design provider, when the manufacturer (retailer) is the leader, the retailer (manufacturer) providing the service design should be the dominant strategy. When the recycler is the leader, the effect is the same no matter who provides the service design. Finally, we find an interesting conclusion that in the case of retailer provides service design, supply chain members do not always achieve the highest profits under their own leadership structure. The numerical analysis shows that when the consumer's preference for service design is greater than 6.3, the manufacturer can obtain greater profits under the recycler-led structure, and when consumer's preference for ecological design is greater than 7.1, the retailer can gain greater profits under the recycler-led structure.
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来源期刊
Rairo-Operations Research
Rairo-Operations Research 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
3.60
自引率
22.20%
发文量
206
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: RAIRO-Operations Research is an international journal devoted to high-level pure and applied research on all aspects of operations research. All papers published in RAIRO-Operations Research are critically refereed according to international standards. Any paper will either be accepted (possibly with minor revisions) either submitted to another evaluation (after a major revision) or rejected. Every effort will be made by the Editorial Board to ensure a first answer concerning a submitted paper within three months, and a final decision in a period of time not exceeding six months.
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