控制组合拍卖的通信和计算复杂性:燃料出价语言

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-06-15 DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4465
M. Bichler, Paul R. Milgrom, G. Schwarz
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引用次数: 4

摘要

组合拍卖已被广泛应用于在存在复杂投标人偏好的情况下分配多个物品。尽管在大型拍卖中,列举所有相关包或解决由此产生的NP-hard中标者确定问题存在困难,但列举性排他性或(XOR)投标语言实际上是频谱拍卖和其他应用的标准投标语言。我们介绍了灵活使用和有效许可(FUEL)投标语言,该语言被提议用于无线电频谱拍卖,与基于xor的拍卖相比,它简化了通信和计算。我们将最终的分配问题建模为一个整数程序,讨论了计算复杂性,并进行了大量的计算实验,结果表明,FUEL投标语言的获胜者确定问题可以在平均不到半小时的时间内可靠地解决大型现实问题实例。相比之下,使用异或出价语言的拍卖即使对于更小的问题规模也会很快变得棘手。我们将密封竞价燃料拍卖与带有异或竞价语言的密封竞价拍卖和同步时钟拍卖进行了比较。采用异或竞价语言的封闭式竞价由于缺失竞价问题和计算难度造成了巨大的福利损失,同时时钟竞价由于曝光问题导致效率明显低于FUEL。这篇论文被Axel Ockenfels接受。
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Taming the Communication and Computation Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions: The FUEL Bid Language
Combinatorial auctions have found widespread application for allocating multiple items in the presence of complex bidder preferences. The enumerative exclusive OR (XOR) bid language is the de facto standard bid language for spectrum auctions and other applications, despite the difficulties, in larger auctions, of enumerating all the relevant packages or solving the resulting NP-hard winner determination problem. We introduce the flexible use and efficient licensing (FUEL) bid language, which was proposed for radio spectrum auctions to ease both communications and computations compared with XOR-based auctions. We model the resulting allocation problem as an integer program, discuss computational complexity, and conduct an extensive set of computational experiments, showing that the winner determination problem of the FUEL bid language can be solved reliably for large realistic-sized problem instances in less than half an hour on average. In contrast, auctions with an XOR bid language quickly become intractable even for much smaller problem sizes. We compare a sealed-bid FUEL auction to a sealed-bid auction with an XOR bid language and to a simultaneous clock auction. The sealed-bid auction with an XOR bid language incurs significant welfare losses because of the missing bids problem and computational hardness, the simultaneous clock auction leads to a substantially lower efficiency than FUEL because of the exposure problem. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels.
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