{"title":"关于逻辑推论的替代分析的形式注释","authors":"V. Halbach","doi":"10.1215/00294527-2020-0009","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Logical consequence in first-order predicate logic is defined substitutionally in set theory augmented with a primitive satisfaction predicate: An argument is defined to be logically valid iff there is no substitution instance with true premisses and a false conclusion. Substitution instances are permitted to contain parameters. Variants of this definition of logical consequence are given: Logical validity can be defined with or without identity as a logical constant, and quantifiers can be relativized in substitution instances or not. It is shown that the resulting notions of logical consequence are extensionally equivalent to versions of first-order provability and thus model-theoretic consequence. Every modeltheoretic interpretation has a substitutional counterpart, but not vice versa. In particular, in contrast to the model-theoretic account, there is a trivial intended interpretation on the substitutional account, namely the homophonic interpretation that does not substitute anything. Applications to free logic, second-order logic, and theories and languages other than set theory are sketched. 1 The Substitutional Analysis of Logical Consequence In what could be called semantic theories of logical consequence – as opposed to proof-theoretic analyses –, logical consequence is defined as truth preservation under all interpretations. In model-theoretic semantics, interpretations are conceived as formal set-theoretic models. However, this is only a very recent understanding of interpretation. Traditionally, in order to refute the formal validity of an argument, logicians showed that there is a substitution instance with true premisses but a false conclusion. Such an interpretation is a substitutional counterexample to the argument in question. In the present paper I attempt to revive the substitutional understanding of interpretation and make the informal substitutional account precise in a mathematical setting for first-order predicate logic. The substitutional account of logical consequence advanced in this paper contrasts with earlier substitutional definitions of logical truth and consequence by Quine [20] 2010 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary 03A05, 03B10","PeriodicalId":51259,"journal":{"name":"Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic","volume":"3 1","pages":"317-339"},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Formal Notes on the Substitutional Analysis of Logical Consequence\",\"authors\":\"V. 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In particular, in contrast to the model-theoretic account, there is a trivial intended interpretation on the substitutional account, namely the homophonic interpretation that does not substitute anything. Applications to free logic, second-order logic, and theories and languages other than set theory are sketched. 1 The Substitutional Analysis of Logical Consequence In what could be called semantic theories of logical consequence – as opposed to proof-theoretic analyses –, logical consequence is defined as truth preservation under all interpretations. In model-theoretic semantics, interpretations are conceived as formal set-theoretic models. However, this is only a very recent understanding of interpretation. Traditionally, in order to refute the formal validity of an argument, logicians showed that there is a substitution instance with true premisses but a false conclusion. Such an interpretation is a substitutional counterexample to the argument in question. In the present paper I attempt to revive the substitutional understanding of interpretation and make the informal substitutional account precise in a mathematical setting for first-order predicate logic. 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Formal Notes on the Substitutional Analysis of Logical Consequence
Logical consequence in first-order predicate logic is defined substitutionally in set theory augmented with a primitive satisfaction predicate: An argument is defined to be logically valid iff there is no substitution instance with true premisses and a false conclusion. Substitution instances are permitted to contain parameters. Variants of this definition of logical consequence are given: Logical validity can be defined with or without identity as a logical constant, and quantifiers can be relativized in substitution instances or not. It is shown that the resulting notions of logical consequence are extensionally equivalent to versions of first-order provability and thus model-theoretic consequence. Every modeltheoretic interpretation has a substitutional counterpart, but not vice versa. In particular, in contrast to the model-theoretic account, there is a trivial intended interpretation on the substitutional account, namely the homophonic interpretation that does not substitute anything. Applications to free logic, second-order logic, and theories and languages other than set theory are sketched. 1 The Substitutional Analysis of Logical Consequence In what could be called semantic theories of logical consequence – as opposed to proof-theoretic analyses –, logical consequence is defined as truth preservation under all interpretations. In model-theoretic semantics, interpretations are conceived as formal set-theoretic models. However, this is only a very recent understanding of interpretation. Traditionally, in order to refute the formal validity of an argument, logicians showed that there is a substitution instance with true premisses but a false conclusion. Such an interpretation is a substitutional counterexample to the argument in question. In the present paper I attempt to revive the substitutional understanding of interpretation and make the informal substitutional account precise in a mathematical setting for first-order predicate logic. The substitutional account of logical consequence advanced in this paper contrasts with earlier substitutional definitions of logical truth and consequence by Quine [20] 2010 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary 03A05, 03B10
期刊介绍:
The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, founded in 1960, aims to publish high quality and original research papers in philosophical logic, mathematical logic, and related areas, including papers of compelling historical interest. The Journal is also willing to selectively publish expository articles on important current topics of interest as well as book reviews.