{"title":"对可检索性的有效证明","authors":"Jia Xu, E. Chang","doi":"10.1145/2414456.2414503","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Proofs of Retrievability (POR) is a cryptographic formulation for remotely auditing the integrity of files stored in the cloud, without keeping a copy of the original files in local storage. In a POR scheme, a user Alice backups her data file together with some authentication data to a potentially dishonest cloud storage server Bob. Later, Alice can periodically and remotely verify the integrity of her data file using the authentication data, without retrieving back the data file. Besides security, performances in communication, storage overhead and computation are major considerations. Shacham and Waters (Asiacrypt '08) gave a fast scheme with O(sλ) bits communication cost and a factor of 1/s file size expansion where λ is the security parameter. In this paper, we incorporate a recent construction of constant size polynomial commitment scheme (Kate, Zaverucha and Goldberg, Asiacrypt '10) into Shacham and Waters scheme. The resulting scheme requires O(λ) communication bits (particularly, 920 bits if a 160 bits elliptic curve group is used or 3512 bits if a 1024 bits modulo group is used) per verification and a factor of 1/s file size expansion. Experiment results show that our proposed scheme is indeed efficient and practical. Our security proof is based on Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption.","PeriodicalId":72308,"journal":{"name":"Asia CCS '22 : proceedings of the 2022 ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security : May 30-June 3, 2022, Nagasaki, Japan. 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引用次数: 106
摘要
可检索性证明(proof of Retrievability, POR)是一种加密公式,用于远程审计存储在云中的文件的完整性,而无需在本地存储中保留原始文件的副本。在POR方案中,用户Alice将她的数据文件和一些身份验证数据备份到可能不诚实的云存储服务器Bob。之后,Alice可以使用身份验证数据定期远程验证其数据文件的完整性,而无需检索数据文件。除了安全性之外,通信性能、存储开销和计算也是主要考虑因素。Shacham和Waters (Asiacrypt '08)给出了一种快速方案,其通信成本为0 (λ)位,文件大小扩展系数为1/s,其中λ为安全参数。在本文中,我们将最近构造的常大小多项式承诺方案(Kate, Zaverucha and Goldberg, Asiacrypt '10)纳入到Shacham和Waters方案中。所得到的方案每次验证需要O(λ)通信位(特别是,如果使用160位椭圆曲线组,则需要920位,如果使用1024位模组,则需要3512位)和1/s文件大小扩展因子。实验结果表明,该方案是有效的、实用的。我们的安全证明基于强迪菲-赫尔曼假设。
Proofs of Retrievability (POR) is a cryptographic formulation for remotely auditing the integrity of files stored in the cloud, without keeping a copy of the original files in local storage. In a POR scheme, a user Alice backups her data file together with some authentication data to a potentially dishonest cloud storage server Bob. Later, Alice can periodically and remotely verify the integrity of her data file using the authentication data, without retrieving back the data file. Besides security, performances in communication, storage overhead and computation are major considerations. Shacham and Waters (Asiacrypt '08) gave a fast scheme with O(sλ) bits communication cost and a factor of 1/s file size expansion where λ is the security parameter. In this paper, we incorporate a recent construction of constant size polynomial commitment scheme (Kate, Zaverucha and Goldberg, Asiacrypt '10) into Shacham and Waters scheme. The resulting scheme requires O(λ) communication bits (particularly, 920 bits if a 160 bits elliptic curve group is used or 3512 bits if a 1024 bits modulo group is used) per verification and a factor of 1/s file size expansion. Experiment results show that our proposed scheme is indeed efficient and practical. Our security proof is based on Strong Diffie-Hellman Assumption.