组织间业务应用程序集成的激励机制

Rasool Esmaeilyfard, Atefe Salehi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在电子商务或电子政务领域扩展组织的服务和操作有时需要集成业务应用程序。然而,有时由于挑战和风险,例如复杂的业务流程再工程,上游组织不愿意集成它们的应用程序。本文主要关注两个关键问题;(1)如何鼓励组织参与整合其业务应用程序?(2)需要多少奖励?在本研究中,合作博弈论和这些系统的外部性被考虑在组织之间形成一个稳定的联盟来整合他们的业务应用程序。我们提供了一种算法,用于确定将业务应用程序与该联盟中的其他组织集成的动机。这些激励措施可以扩展到各种管理问题,以便作出更好的决策,例如经济方面、公共补贴和公众参与。实验结果表明,基于此策略创建联盟总是可能的,并且联盟中的组织的利益随着业务应用程序中服务交付的增加而增加。
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An incentive mechanism for integration of business applications between organizations
Extending services and operations of organizations in the field of e-business or e-government sometimes requires the integration of business applications. However, sometimes due to challenges and risks, such as complex business processes reengineering, upstream organizations are reluctant to integrate their applications. This paper focuses on two critical questions; (1) How can organizations be encouraged to participate in integrating their business applications? (2) What is the amount of incentives required? In this study, cooperative game theory and the externalities of these systems have been considered to form a stable coalition between organizations for integrating their business applications. We provided an algorithm for determining the incentives to integrate the business applications with other organizations in this coalition. These incentives can be extended to various management issues for better decision-making such as economic aspects, public subsidies, and public participation. The results of experiments have shown that creating a coalition based on this strategy is always possible, and the benefits of organizations in the coalition rise with increasing service delivery in business applications.
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