问题空间中对抗性ML攻击的有趣性质

Fabio Pierazzi, Feargus Pendlebury, Jacopo Cortellazzi, L. Cavallaro
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引用次数: 186

摘要

最近对抗性机器学习的研究工作已经研究了问题空间攻击,重点是在与图像不同的领域(例如软件)没有明确的逆映射到特征空间的领域中生成真正的回避对象。然而,问题空间攻击的设计、比较和实际含义仍然没有得到充分的研究。本文有两个主要贡献。首先,我们为问题空间中的对抗性ML逃避攻击提出了一种新的形式化方法,其中包括对可用转换、保留语义、预处理鲁棒性和合理性的一组全面约束的定义。我们阐明了特征空间和问题空间的关系,并引入了作为逆特征映射问题副产物的副作用特征的概念。这使我们能够定义和证明存在问题空间攻击的充分必要条件。通过使用形式化描述来自不同领域的相关文献中的几种攻击,我们进一步展示了形式化的表达能力。其次,在我们的形式化的基础上,我们提出了一种新的问题空间攻击Android恶意软件,克服了过去的限制。在2017年和2018年的170K Android应用程序数据集上进行的实验表明,规避最先进的恶意软件分类器及其强化版本的实际可行性。我们的研究结果表明,“对抗性恶意软件即服务”是一个现实的威胁,因为我们自动大规模地生成了数千个现实的、不显眼的对抗性应用程序,平均只需要几分钟就能生成一个对抗性应用程序。然而,在过去六年中发表的1600多篇关于对抗性机器学习的论文中,大约有40篇专注于恶意软件[15],而且许多只在特征空间中。我们对问题空间攻击的形式化为这一领域更有原则性的研究铺平了道路。我们负责任地向其他研究人员发布了我们的新攻击的代码和数据集,以鼓励未来在问题空间的防御工作。
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Intriguing Properties of Adversarial ML Attacks in the Problem Space
Recent research efforts on adversarial ML have investigated problem-space attacks, focusing on the generation of real evasive objects in domains where, unlike images, there is no clear inverse mapping to the feature space (e.g., software). However, the design, comparison, and real-world implications of problem-space attacks remain underexplored.This paper makes two major contributions. First, we propose a novel formalization for adversarial ML evasion attacks in the problem-space, which includes the definition of a comprehensive set of constraints on available transformations, preserved semantics, robustness to preprocessing, and plausibility. We shed light on the relationship between feature space and problem space, and we introduce the concept of side-effect features as the byproduct of the inverse feature-mapping problem. This enables us to define and prove necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of problem-space attacks. We further demonstrate the expressive power of our formalization by using it to describe several attacks from related literature across different domains.Second, building on our formalization, we propose a novel problem-space attack on Android malware that overcomes past limitations. Experiments on a dataset with 170K Android apps from 2017 and 2018 show the practical feasibility of evading a state-of-the-art malware classifier along with its hardened version. Our results demonstrate that "adversarial-malware as a service" is a realistic threat, as we automatically generate thousands of realistic and inconspicuous adversarial applications at scale, where on average it takes only a few minutes to generate an adversarial app. Yet, out of the 1600+ papers on adversarial ML published in the past six years, roughly 40 focus on malware [15]—and many remain only in the feature space.Our formalization of problem-space attacks paves the way to more principled research in this domain. We responsibly release the code and dataset of our novel attack to other researchers, to encourage future work on defenses in the problem space.
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