{"title":"广播秘密共享,边界和应用","authors":"I. Damgård, Kasper Green Larsen, Sophia Yakoubov","doi":"10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2021.10","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Consider a sender S and a group of n recipients. S holds a secret message m of length l bits and the goal is to allow S to create a secret sharing of m with privacy threshold t among the recipients, by broadcasting a single message c to the recipients. Our goal is to do this with information theoretic security in a model with a simple form of correlated randomness. Namely, for each subset A of recipients of size q, S may share a random key with all recipients in A. (The keys shared with different subsets A must be independent.) We call this Broadcast Secret-Sharing (BSS) with parameters l, n, t and q. Our main question is: how large must c be, as a function of the parameters? We show that n−t q l is a lower bound, and we show an upper bound of ( n(t+1) q+t − t)l, matching the lower bound whenever t = 0, or when q = 1 or n − t. When q = n − t, the size of c is exactly l which is clearly minimal. The protocol demonstrating the upper bound in this case requires S to share a key with every subset of size n − t. We show that this overhead cannot be avoided when c has minimal size. We also show that if access is additionally given to an idealized PRG, the lower bound on ciphertext size becomes n−t q λ + l − negl(λ) (where λ is the length of the input to the PRG). The upper bound becomes ( n(t+1) q+t − t)λ + l. BSS can be applied directly to secret-key threshold encryption. We can also consider a setting where the correlated randomness is generated using computationally secure and non-interactive key exchange, where we assume that each recipient has an (independently generated) public key for this purpose. In this model, any protocol for non-interactive secret sharing becomes an ad hoc threshold encryption (ATE) scheme, which is a threshold encryption scheme with no trusted setup beyond a PKI. Our upper bounds imply new ATE schemes, and our lower bound becomes a lower bound on the ciphertext size in any ATE scheme that uses a key exchange functionality and no other cryptographic primitives. 2012 ACM Subject Classification Security and privacy → Information-theoretic techniques","PeriodicalId":6403,"journal":{"name":"2007 IEEE International Test Conference","volume":" 43","pages":"10:1-10:20"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Broadcast Secret-Sharing, Bounds and Applications\",\"authors\":\"I. Damgård, Kasper Green Larsen, Sophia Yakoubov\",\"doi\":\"10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2021.10\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Consider a sender S and a group of n recipients. S holds a secret message m of length l bits and the goal is to allow S to create a secret sharing of m with privacy threshold t among the recipients, by broadcasting a single message c to the recipients. Our goal is to do this with information theoretic security in a model with a simple form of correlated randomness. Namely, for each subset A of recipients of size q, S may share a random key with all recipients in A. (The keys shared with different subsets A must be independent.) We call this Broadcast Secret-Sharing (BSS) with parameters l, n, t and q. Our main question is: how large must c be, as a function of the parameters? We show that n−t q l is a lower bound, and we show an upper bound of ( n(t+1) q+t − t)l, matching the lower bound whenever t = 0, or when q = 1 or n − t. When q = n − t, the size of c is exactly l which is clearly minimal. The protocol demonstrating the upper bound in this case requires S to share a key with every subset of size n − t. We show that this overhead cannot be avoided when c has minimal size. We also show that if access is additionally given to an idealized PRG, the lower bound on ciphertext size becomes n−t q λ + l − negl(λ) (where λ is the length of the input to the PRG). The upper bound becomes ( n(t+1) q+t − t)λ + l. BSS can be applied directly to secret-key threshold encryption. We can also consider a setting where the correlated randomness is generated using computationally secure and non-interactive key exchange, where we assume that each recipient has an (independently generated) public key for this purpose. In this model, any protocol for non-interactive secret sharing becomes an ad hoc threshold encryption (ATE) scheme, which is a threshold encryption scheme with no trusted setup beyond a PKI. Our upper bounds imply new ATE schemes, and our lower bound becomes a lower bound on the ciphertext size in any ATE scheme that uses a key exchange functionality and no other cryptographic primitives. 2012 ACM Subject Classification Security and privacy → Information-theoretic techniques\",\"PeriodicalId\":6403,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2007 IEEE International Test Conference\",\"volume\":\" 43\",\"pages\":\"10:1-10:20\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2007 IEEE International Test Conference\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2021.10\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2007 IEEE International Test Conference","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.ITC.2021.10","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Consider a sender S and a group of n recipients. S holds a secret message m of length l bits and the goal is to allow S to create a secret sharing of m with privacy threshold t among the recipients, by broadcasting a single message c to the recipients. Our goal is to do this with information theoretic security in a model with a simple form of correlated randomness. Namely, for each subset A of recipients of size q, S may share a random key with all recipients in A. (The keys shared with different subsets A must be independent.) We call this Broadcast Secret-Sharing (BSS) with parameters l, n, t and q. Our main question is: how large must c be, as a function of the parameters? We show that n−t q l is a lower bound, and we show an upper bound of ( n(t+1) q+t − t)l, matching the lower bound whenever t = 0, or when q = 1 or n − t. When q = n − t, the size of c is exactly l which is clearly minimal. The protocol demonstrating the upper bound in this case requires S to share a key with every subset of size n − t. We show that this overhead cannot be avoided when c has minimal size. We also show that if access is additionally given to an idealized PRG, the lower bound on ciphertext size becomes n−t q λ + l − negl(λ) (where λ is the length of the input to the PRG). The upper bound becomes ( n(t+1) q+t − t)λ + l. BSS can be applied directly to secret-key threshold encryption. We can also consider a setting where the correlated randomness is generated using computationally secure and non-interactive key exchange, where we assume that each recipient has an (independently generated) public key for this purpose. In this model, any protocol for non-interactive secret sharing becomes an ad hoc threshold encryption (ATE) scheme, which is a threshold encryption scheme with no trusted setup beyond a PKI. Our upper bounds imply new ATE schemes, and our lower bound becomes a lower bound on the ciphertext size in any ATE scheme that uses a key exchange functionality and no other cryptographic primitives. 2012 ACM Subject Classification Security and privacy → Information-theoretic techniques