{"title":"产能受限双头垄断中掠夺性定价的可行性","authors":"Giacomo Corneo, Olivier Jeanne","doi":"10.1016/0035-5054(93)90008-Q","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Predatory pricing is <em>feasible</em> only if the minimax profit of the prey is strictly smaller than the expected profit in the corresponding Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. We completely characterize the conditions for feasibility of predatory pricing in Kreps and Scheinkman's model of capacity-constrained duopoly. The predator must have a capacity larger than that of the prey, and also larger than the Cournot capacity. Surprisingly, predatory pricing may be infeasible not only if the prey is too large but also if it is too small.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101136,"journal":{"name":"Ricerche Economiche","volume":"47 4","pages":"Pages 355-361"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1993-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/0035-5054(93)90008-Q","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Feasibility of predatory pricing in a capacity-constrained duopoly\",\"authors\":\"Giacomo Corneo, Olivier Jeanne\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/0035-5054(93)90008-Q\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Predatory pricing is <em>feasible</em> only if the minimax profit of the prey is strictly smaller than the expected profit in the corresponding Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. We completely characterize the conditions for feasibility of predatory pricing in Kreps and Scheinkman's model of capacity-constrained duopoly. The predator must have a capacity larger than that of the prey, and also larger than the Cournot capacity. Surprisingly, predatory pricing may be infeasible not only if the prey is too large but also if it is too small.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":101136,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Ricerche Economiche\",\"volume\":\"47 4\",\"pages\":\"Pages 355-361\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1993-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/0035-5054(93)90008-Q\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Ricerche Economiche\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/003550549390008Q\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ricerche Economiche","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/003550549390008Q","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Feasibility of predatory pricing in a capacity-constrained duopoly
Predatory pricing is feasible only if the minimax profit of the prey is strictly smaller than the expected profit in the corresponding Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. We completely characterize the conditions for feasibility of predatory pricing in Kreps and Scheinkman's model of capacity-constrained duopoly. The predator must have a capacity larger than that of the prey, and also larger than the Cournot capacity. Surprisingly, predatory pricing may be infeasible not only if the prey is too large but also if it is too small.
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