W.马修斯-格兰特的《双重来源帐户和最终责任》。

Jordan Wessling, P Roger Turner
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引用次数: 0

摘要

一些哲学家和神学家最近对一个常见的假设提出了质疑,即上帝不可能使人类做出自由主义或不自由主义意义上的自由行动。马修斯-格兰特(W. Matthews Grant)或许是这一挑战最复杂的版本。格兰特详细阐述了神的因果关系,认为神的普遍因果关系并不排除人类对自己的行为负有最终责任,也不排除典型的自由主义论述中的自由。在此,我们认为,格兰特提出的那种神的普遍因果关系与罗伯特-凯恩(Robert Kane)颇具影响力的终极责任概念的合理解释是不相容的。这一结论意义重大,因为格兰特试图将他的神性因果说与凯恩对终极责任的阐述统一起来。
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W. Matthews Grant's Dual Sources Account and Ultimate Responsibility.

A number of philosophers and theologians have recently challenged the common assumption that it would be impossible for God to cause humans actions which are free in the libertarian or incompatibilist sense. Perhaps the most sophisticated version of this challenge is due to W. Matthews Grant. By offering a detailed account of divine causation, Grant argues that divine universal causation does not preclude humans from being ultimately responsible for their actions, nor free according to typical libertarian accounts. Here, we argue that the kind of divine universal causation that Grant proposes is incompatible with a plausible interpretation of Robert Kane's influential conception of ultimate responsibility. This conclusion is significant since Grant seeks to harmonize his divine causal account with Kane's articulation of ultimate responsibility.

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