确定原则

IF 1 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Mathematical Economics Pub Date : 2023-10-31 DOI:10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102915
Jean Baccelli , Lorenz Hartmann
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引用次数: 0

摘要

萨维奇对主观预期效用的公理化中出现了著名的确定性原则。然而,Savage只是将其作为一种非正式的、首要的支配条件来引入,从而推动了他的可分离性假设P2和他的国家独立性假设P3。一旦这些公理被引入,总的来说,他就不再讨论这个原理了。在这篇文章中,我们将从萨维奇留下的有把握原则开始分析。特别地,我们证明了P2和P3中的每一个都等价于一个优势条件;它们从不同的方向强化了一个共同的、基本的支配公理;并且它们可以明确地结合在一个统一的优势条件中,这是确定原则的候选形式陈述。基于基本证明,我们的结果揭示了不确定性下理性选择的一些最基本的性质。特别是,作为推论,它们暗示了对萨维奇和安斯科姆-奥曼主观预期效用公理化的潜在简化。也许最令人惊讶的是,他们揭示了萨维奇的公理化,P3可以被削弱为所谓的明显优势的自然加强。
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The Sure-Thing Principle

The Sure-Thing Principle famously appears in Savage’s axiomatization of Subjective Expected Utility. Yet Savage introduces it only as an informal, overarching dominance condition motivating his separability postulate P2 and his state-independence postulate P3. Once these axioms are introduced, by and large, he does not discuss the principle any more. In this note, we pick up the analysis of the Sure-Thing Principle where Savage left it. In particular, we show that each of P2 and P3 is equivalent to a dominance condition; that they strengthen in different directions a common, basic dominance axiom; and that they can be explicitly combined in a unified dominance condition that is a candidate formal statement for the Sure-Thing Principle. Based on elementary proofs, our results shed light on some of the most fundamental properties of rational choice under uncertainty. In particular they imply, as corollaries, potential simplifications for Savage’s and the Anscombe-Aumann axiomatizations of Subjective Expected Utility. Most surprisingly perhaps, they reveal that in Savage’s axiomatization, P3 can be weakened to a natural strengthening of so-called Obvious Dominance.

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来源期刊
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Journal of Mathematical Economics 管理科学-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
7.70%
发文量
73
审稿时长
12.5 weeks
期刊介绍: The primary objective of the Journal is to provide a forum for work in economic theory which expresses economic ideas using formal mathematical reasoning. For work to add to this primary objective, it is not sufficient that the mathematical reasoning be new and correct. The work must have real economic content. The economic ideas must be interesting and important. These ideas may pertain to any field of economics or any school of economic thought.
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