公司资本成本与杠杆:一个简化的教科书关系。

Valentin Haag, Christian Koziol
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在本文中,我们重新审视了WACC方法中经常使用的简化方法,即公司资本成本k V应该与负债率不变,因此等于未杠杆成本k U。尽管我们从Miles和Ezzell(1980)那里知道k V在形式上不同于k U,但将这两种成本视为相等,极大地促进了实际的公司估值,例如,当公司在交易后战略性地将目标负债率改变为显著不同的幅度时。我们使用德国股票市场的29家公司提供理论模型和实证分析,以量化杠杆化和其他相同但未杠杆化的公司成本之间的经济意义。特别是,在没有违约风险的情况下,我们可以在数字上支持通常的简化。然而,在公司存在违约风险的情况下,实证研究结果表明,即使假设破产成本适中,这些成本之间的明显差异也平均为1.88个百分点,这意味着公司的错误定价接近100%。因此,如果公司没有违约风险或者破产成本可以忽略不计,那么公司的资金成本实际上并不取决于负债率。否则,它确实存在,忽视这种关系可能会导致严重的错误定价。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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Company Cost of Capital and Leverage: A Simplified Textbook Relationship Revisited.

In this paper, we revisit a frequently employed simplification within the WACC approach that company cost of capital k V is supposed to be invariant to the debt ratio and therefore equal to the unlevered cost k U . Even though we know from Miles and Ezzell (1980) that k V formally differs from k U , treating both costs as equal strongly facilitates the practical firm valuation e.g. when companies strategically change their target debt ratios to a significantly different magnitude after a transaction. We provide both a theoretical model and an empirical analysis using 29 firms of the German stock market to quantify the economic significance between the company cost of a levered and an otherwise identical but unlevered firm. In particular, we can numerically support the usual simplification in the absence of default risk. In case that firms are default-risky, however, empirical findings indicate a clear difference between these costs equal to 1.88 percentage points on average even for moderate assumed bankruptcy costs which translates to a company mispricing of nearly 100%. As a result, the company cost of capital does practically not depend on the debt ratio if the firm is not subject to default risk or if bankruptcy costs are negligible. Otherwise, it does and a negligence of this relationship can cause significant mispricings.

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