损害论,堕胎的伦理,损害到n + 1度的本质。

IF 2.3 2区 哲学 Q1 ETHICS Medicine Health Care and Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI:10.1007/s11019-023-10137-z
Alex R Gillham
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我认为减值原则需要澄清。它需要解释是什么使一种损害大于另一种,否则我们将无法进行它所要求的比较,这些比较使我们能够确定b是否真的比a造成更大的损害,因此,导致b是否不道德,因为导致a是不道德的。然后,我提出了两种我认为最自然的解释,说明是什么可能使一种损害大于另一种损害。对更大减值的定量理解是有问题的,因为它使减值原则容易受到反例的影响;仅仅因为损伤b损害更多的能力或相同数量的能力但时间较长或更高的学位并不意味着b是一个比一个更大的障碍。定性的理解更大的障碍是有问题的,因为它并不能解释文献中使用的更大障碍的例子,意味着堕胎总是一个定性更严重的损伤导致胎儿酒精综合症不管有机体是如何影响的,和/或意味着致命损害总是大于非致命损害。
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The impairment argument, ethics of abortion, and nature of impairing to the n + 1 degree.

I argue here that the impairment principle requires clarification. It needs to explain what makes one impairment greater than another, otherwise we will be unable to make the comparisons it requires, the ones that enable us to determine whether b really is a greater impairment than a, and as a result, whether causing b is immoral because causing a is. I then develop two of what I think are the most natural accounts of what might make one impairment greater than another. The quantitative understanding of greater impairment is problematic because it leaves the impairment principle vulnerable to counterexamples; just because impairment b impairs a larger number of abilities or the same number of abilities but for a longer period or to a higher degree does not mean that b is a greater impairment than a. The qualitative understanding of greater impairment is problematic because it does not explain examples of greater impairment used in the literature, means that an abortion is always a qualitatively more severe impairment than causing fetal alcohol syndrome regardless of how the organism is affected, and/or entails that lethal impairment is always greater than nonlethal impairment.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.30
自引率
4.80%
发文量
64
期刊介绍: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy: A European Journal is the official journal of the European Society for Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care. It provides a forum for international exchange of research data, theories, reports and opinions in bioethics and philosophy of medicine. The journal promotes interdisciplinary studies, and stimulates philosophical analysis centered on a common object of reflection: health care, the human effort to deal with disease, illness, death as well as health, well-being and life. Particular attention is paid to developing contributions from all European countries, and to making accessible scientific work and reports on the practice of health care ethics, from all nations, cultures and language areas in Europe.
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