{"title":"动态委托代理环境下随机冲击对相互行为的影响。","authors":"Rudolf Kerschbamer, Regine Oexl","doi":"10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on efficiency in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly pronounced in gift-exchange relationships where the same principal-agent pair interacts repeatedly. In dynamic relationships, shocks have a significantly less pronounced negative effect on efficiency than in static relationships. In an attempt to identify the drivers for our results we find that the combination of a repeated-game effect (current misbehavior can be punished in future periods) and a noise-canceling effect (part of the noise cancels out in the long run) is required to avoid the detrimental effects of unobservable random shocks on efficiency.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w.</p>","PeriodicalId":47992,"journal":{"name":"Experimental Economics","volume":"26 2","pages":"468-488"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10129933/pdf/","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings.\",\"authors\":\"Rudolf Kerschbamer, Regine Oexl\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on efficiency in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly pronounced in gift-exchange relationships where the same principal-agent pair interacts repeatedly. In dynamic relationships, shocks have a significantly less pronounced negative effect on efficiency than in static relationships. In an attempt to identify the drivers for our results we find that the combination of a repeated-game effect (current misbehavior can be punished in future periods) and a noise-canceling effect (part of the noise cancels out in the long run) is required to avoid the detrimental effects of unobservable random shocks on efficiency.</p><p><strong>Supplementary information: </strong>The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47992,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Experimental Economics\",\"volume\":\"26 2\",\"pages\":\"468-488\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10129933/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Experimental Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Experimental Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings.
Previous work has shown that unobservable random shocks on output have a detrimental effect on efficiency in short-term ('static') employment relationships. Given the prevalence of long-term ('dynamic') relationships in firms, we investigate whether the impact of shocks is similarly pronounced in gift-exchange relationships where the same principal-agent pair interacts repeatedly. In dynamic relationships, shocks have a significantly less pronounced negative effect on efficiency than in static relationships. In an attempt to identify the drivers for our results we find that the combination of a repeated-game effect (current misbehavior can be punished in future periods) and a noise-canceling effect (part of the noise cancels out in the long run) is required to avoid the detrimental effects of unobservable random shocks on efficiency.
Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10683-022-09771-w.
期刊介绍：
Experimental methods are uniquely suited to the study of many phenomena that have been difficult to observe directly in naturally occurring economic contexts. For example, the ability to induce preferences and control information structures makes it possible to isolate the effects of alternate economic structures, policies, and market institutions.Experimental Economics is an international journal that serves the growing group of economists around the world who use experimental methods. The journal invites high-quality papers in any area of experimental research in economics and related fields (i.e. accounting, finance, political science, and the psychology of decision making). State-of-the-art theoretical work and econometric work that is motivated by experimental data is also encouraged. The journal will also consider articles with a primary focus on methodology or replication of controversial findings. We welcome experiments conducted in either the laboratory or in the field. The relevant data can be decisions or non-choice data such as physiological measurements. However, we only consider studies that do not employ deception of participants and in which participants are incentivized. Experimental Economics is structured to promote experimental economics by bringing together innovative research that meets professional standards of experimental method, but without editorial bias towards specific orientations. All papers will be reviewed through the standard, anonymous-referee procedure and all accepted manuscripts will be subject to the approval of two editors. Authors must submit the instructions that participants in their study received at the time of submission of their manuscript. Authors are expected to submit separate data appendices which will be attached to the journal''s web page upon publication. Officially cited as: Exp Econ
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