On the non-uniqueness problem in integrated information theory.

Abstract

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) 3.0 is among the leading theories of consciousness in contemporary neuroscience. The core of the theory relies on the calculation of a scalar mathematical measure of consciousness, Φ, which is inspired by the phenomenological axioms of the theory. Here, we show that despite its widespread application, Φ is not a well-defined mathematical concept in the sense that the value it specifies is non-unique. To demonstrate this, we introduce an algorithm that calculates all possible Φ values for a given system in strict accordance with the mathematical definition from the theory. We show that, to date, all published Φ values under consideration are selected arbitrarily from a multitude of equally valid alternatives. Crucially, both [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] are often predicted simultaneously, rendering any interpretation of these systems as conscious or not, non-decidable in the current formulation of IIT.