Neuroscience of Consciousness最新文献

This paper explores the relationship between intuition and flow from a neurodynamics perspective. Flow and intuition represent two cognitive phenomena rooted in nonconscious information processing; however, there are clear differences in both their phenomenal characteristics and, more broadly, their contribution to action and cognition. We propose, extrapolating from dual processing theory, that intuition serves as a rapid, nonconscious decision-making process, while flow facilitates this process in action, achieving optimal cognitive control and performance without [conscious] deliberation. By exploring these points of convergence between flow and intuition, we also attempt to reconcile the apparent paradox of the presence of enhanced intuition in flow, which is also a state of heightened cognitive control. To do so, we utilize a revised dual-processing framework, which allows us to productively align and differentiate flow and intuition (including intuition in flow). Furthermore, we draw on recent work examining flow from an active inference perspective. Our account not only heightens understanding of human cognition and consciousness, but also raises new questions for future research, aiming to deepen our comprehension of how flow and intuition can be harnessed to elevate human performance and wellbeing.

We apply the methodology of no-go theorems as developed in physics to the question of artificial consciousness. The result is a no-go theorem which shows that under a general assumption, called dynamical relevance, Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems that run on contemporary computer chips cannot be conscious. Consciousness is dynamically relevant, simply put, if, according to a theory of consciousness, it is relevant for the temporal evolution of a system's states. The no-go theorem rests on facts about semiconductor development: that AI systems run on central processing units, graphics processing units, tensor processing units, or other processors which have been designed and verified to adhere to computational dynamics that systematically preclude or suppress deviations. Whether our result resolves the question of AI consciousness on contemporary processors depends on the truth of the theorem's main assumption, dynamical relevance, which this paper does not establish.

This paper explores the limitations of neurobiological approaches to human emotional experience, focusing on the case of grief. We propose that grief is neither an episodic emotion nor a longer-term mood but instead a heterogeneous, temporally extended process. A grief process can incorporate all manner of experiences, thoughts, and activities, most or all of which are not grief-specific. Furthermore, its course over time is shaped in various different ways by interpersonal, social, and cultural environments. This poses methodological challenges for any attempt to relate grief to the brain. Grief also illustrates wider limitations of approaches that conceive of emotions as brief episodes, abstracted from the dynamic, holistic, longer-term organization of human emotional life.

Despite the dramatic rise of surveillance in our societies, only limited research has examined its effects on humans. While most research has focused on voluntary behaviour, no study has examined the effects of surveillance on more fundamental and automatic aspects of human perceptual awareness and cognition. Here, we show that being watched on CCTV markedly impacts a hardwired and involuntary function of human sensory perception-the ability to consciously detect faces. Using the method of continuous flash suppression (CFS), we show that when people are surveilled (N = 24), they are quicker than controls (N = 30) to detect faces. An independent control experiment (N = 42) ruled out an explanation based on demand characteristics and social desirability biases. These findings show that being watched impacts not only consciously controlled behaviours but also unconscious, involuntary visual processing. Our results have implications concerning the impacts of surveillance on basic human cognition as well as public mental health.

Auto-induced cognitive trance (AICT) is a modified state of consciousness derived from shamanic tradition that can be practised by individuals after specific training. The aim of this work was to characterize the phenomenological experiences of AICT, using text mining analysis. Free recalls of subjective experiences were audio-recorded in 27 participants after five pseudo-randomized experimental sessions: ordinary conscious resting state, with auditory stimulation and with an imaginary mental task, as well as during AICT with and without auditory stimulation. Recordings were transcribed, normalized total word counts were calculated for each condition, and analyses of content were performed using IRaMuTeQ software. Results showed that the length of the participants' reports was higher for AICT compared to the other conditions, and that the content could be categorized into four classes of discourse: AICT memory, AICT, ordinary conscious states, and AICT with and without stimulation. AICT was also characterized by specific content compared to rest, auditory stimulation, and imagination conditions. Content analysis of the narrative revealed nine categories encompassing the presence of nature, people, animals, positive and negative features, sensory perceptions, body modifications, metacognition, and difficulty of describing thoughts. Among these categories, AICT is specifically characterized by reports related to the presence of nature, animals, body modifications, as well as the difficulty of describing thoughts. These results suggest that a richer phenomenology was reported during AICT, compared to the other conditions, and that AICT constitutes a class of discourse on its own, with a clear dissociation from the other conditions.

The question of the richness (or sparseness) of conscious experience has evoked ongoing debate and discussion. Claims for both richness and sparseness are supported by empirical data, yet they are often indirect, and alternative explanations have been put forward. Recently, it has been suggested that current experimental methods limit participants' responses, thereby preventing researchers from assessing the actual richness of perception. Instead, free verbal reports were presented as a possible way to overcome this limitation. As part of this approach, a novel paradigm of freely reported words was developed using a new metric, intersubjective agreement (IA), with experimental results interpreted as capturing aspects of conscious perception. Here, we challenge the validity of freely reported words as a tool for studying the richness of conscious experience. We base our claims on two studies (each composed of three experiments), where we manipulated the richness of percepts and tested whether IA changed accordingly. Five additional control experiments were conducted to validate the experimental logic and examine alternative explanations. Our results suggest otherwise, presenting four challenges to the free verbal report paradigm: first, impoverished stimuli did not evoke lower IA scores. Second, the IA score was correlated with word frequency in English. Third, the original positive relationship between IA scores and rated confidence was not found in any of the six experiments. Fourth, a high rate of nonexisting words was found, some of which described items that matched the gist of the scene but did not appear in the image. We conclude that a metric based on freely reported words might be better explained by vocabulary conventions and gist-based reports than by capturing the richness of perception.

Internal feeling states such as pain, hunger, and thirst are widely assumed to be drivers of behaviours essential for homeostasis and animal survival. Call this the 'causal assumption'. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the causal assumption is incompatible with the standard view of motor action in neuroscience. While there is a well-known explanatory gap between neural activity and feelings, there is also a disjuncture in the reverse direction-what role, if any, do feelings play in animals if not to cause behaviour? To deny that feelings cause behaviours might thus seem to presage epiphenomenalism-the idea that subjective experiences, including feelings, are inert, emergent and, on some views, non-physical properties of brain processes. Since epiphenomenalism is antagonistic to fundamental commitments of evolutionary biology, the view developed here challenges the standard view about the function of feelings without denying that feelings have a function. Instead, we introduce the 'sense making sense' hypothesis-the idea that the function of subjective experience is not to cause behaviour, but to explain, in a restricted but still useful sense of 'explanation'. A plausible framework is derived that integrates commonly accepted neural computations to blend motor control, feelings, and explanatory processes to make sense of the way feelings are integrated into our sense of how and why we do and what we do.

Mystical-like states of consciousness may arise through means such as psychedelic substances, but may also occur unexpectedly during near-death experiences (NDEs). So far, research studies comparing experiences induced by serotonergic psychedelics and NDEs, along with their enduring effects, have employed between-subject designs, limiting direct comparisons. We present results from an online survey exploring the phenomenology, attribution of reality, psychological insights, and enduring effects of NDEs and psychedelic experiences (PEs) in individuals who have experienced both at some point during their lifetime. We used frequentist and Bayesian analyses to determine significant differences and overlaps (evidence for null hypotheses) between the two. Thirty-one adults reported having experienced both an NDE (i.e. NDE-C scale total score ≥27/80) and a PE (intake of lysergic acid diethylamide, psilocybin/mushrooms, ayahuasca, N,N-dimethyltryptamine, or mescaline). Results revealed areas of overlap between both experiences for phenomenology, attribution of reality, psychological insights, and enduring effects. A finer-grained analysis of the phenomenology revealed a significant overlap in mystical-like effects, while low-level phenomena (sensory effects) were significantly different, with NDEs displaying higher scores of disembodiment and PEs higher scores of visual imagery. This suggests psychedelics as a useful model for studying mystical-like effects induced by NDEs, while highlighting distinctions in sensory experiences.

Afterimages are illusory, visual conscious perceptions. A widely accepted theory is that afterimages are caused by retinal signaling that continues after the physical disappearance of a light stimulus. However, afterimages have been reported without preceding visual, sensory stimulation (e.g. conditioned afterimages and afterimages induced by illusory vision). These observations suggest the role of top-down brain mechanisms in afterimage conscious perception. Therefore, some afterimages may share perceptual features with sensory-independent conscious perceptions (e.g. imagery, hallucinations, and dreams) that occur without bottom-up sensory input. In the current investigation, we tested for a link between the vividness of visual imagery and afterimage conscious perception. Participants reported their vividness of visual imagery and perceived sharpness, contrast, and duration of negative afterimages. The afterimage perceptual features were acquired using perception matching paradigms that were validated on image stimuli. Relating these perceptual reports revealed that the vividness of visual imagery positively correlated with afterimage contrast and sharpness. These behavioral results support shared neural mechanisms between visual imagery and afterimages. However, we cannot exclude alternative explanations, including demand characteristics and afterimage perception reporting inaccuracy. This study encourages future research combining neurophysiology recording methods and afterimage paradigms to directly examine the neural mechanisms of afterimage conscious perception.

In search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), it is important to isolate the true NCCs from their prerequisites, consequences, and co-occurring processes. To date, little is known about how attention affects the event-related potential (ERP) correlates of auditory awareness and there is contradictory evidence on whether one of them, the late positivity (LP), is affected by response requirements. By implementing a GO-NOGO design with target and nontarget stimuli, we controlled for feature-based attention and response requirements in the same experiment, while participants rated their awareness using a perceptual awareness scale. The results showed a prolonged auditory awareness negativity (AAN) for aware trials, which was influenced neither by attention nor by response requirement. The LP was affected by both attention and response requirements. Consistent with the levels of processing hypothesis, the LP was related to consciousness as a correlate of the processing of higher-level stimulus features, likely requiring access to a "global workspace." Our findings further suggest that AAN is a proper ERP correlate of auditory consciousness and thus a true NCC in the auditory modality.