Memories without Survival: Personal Identity and the Ascending Reticular Activating System.

IF 1.3 3区 哲学 Q3 ETHICS Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-09-14 DOI:10.1093/jmp/jhad028
Lukas J Meier
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Lockean views of personal identity maintain that we are essentially persons who persist diachronically by virtue of being psychologically continuous with our former selves. In this article, I present a novel objection to this variant of psychological accounts, which is based on neurophysiological characteristics of the brain. While the mental states that constitute said psychological continuity reside in the cerebral hemispheres, so that for the former to persist only the upper brain must remain intact, being conscious additionally requires that a structure originating in the brainstem-the ascending reticular activating system-be functional. Hence, there can be situations in which even small brainstem lesions render individuals irreversibly comatose and thus forever preclude access to their mental states, while the neural correlates of the states themselves are retained. In these situations, Lockeans are forced to regard as fulfilled their criterion of diachronic persistence since psychological continuity, as they construe it, is not disrupted. Deeming an entity that is never again going to have any mental experiences to be a person, however, is an untenable position for a psychological account to adopt. In their current form, Lockean views of personal identity are therefore incompatible with human neurophysiology.

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没有生存的记忆:个人同一性和上升网状激活系统。
洛克的个人同一性观点认为,我们本质上是历时性地坚持的人,因为我们在心理上与以前的自我是连续的。在这篇文章中,我提出了一个新的反对这种变体的心理帐户,这是基于大脑的神经生理特征。虽然构成心理连续性的精神状态存在于大脑的两个半球中,因此,为了使前者得以持续,只有上部大脑必须保持完整,有意识还需要源自脑干的一个结构——上升网状激活系统——发挥作用。因此,在某些情况下,即使是很小的脑干损伤也会使个体不可逆转地昏迷,从而永远无法进入他们的精神状态,而状态本身的神经关联却被保留下来。在这些情况下,洛克主义者被迫认为,他们的历时持久性标准已经实现,因为心理连续性,正如他们所解释的那样,并没有中断。然而,将一个再也不会有任何心理体验的实体视为一个人,对于心理学解释来说是站不住脚的。因此,以目前的形式来看,洛克的个人同一性观点与人类神经生理学是不相容的。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
6.20%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: This bimonthly publication explores the shared themes and concerns of philosophy and the medical sciences. Central issues in medical research and practice have important philosophical dimensions, for, in treating disease and promoting health, medicine involves presuppositions about human goals and values. Conversely, the concerns of philosophy often significantly relate to those of medicine, as philosophers seek to understand the nature of medical knowledge and the human condition in the modern world. In addition, recent developments in medical technology and treatment create moral problems that raise important philosophical questions. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy aims to provide an ongoing forum for the discussion of such themes and issues.
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