Sumedha Gupta , Thuy Nguyen , Patricia R. Freeman , Kosali Simon
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
A significant concern in the policy landscape of the U.S. opioid crisis is whether supply-side controls can reduce opioid prescribing without harmful substitution. We consider an unstudied policy: the federal Controlled Substance Act (CSA) restrictions placed in August 2014 on tramadol, the second most popular opioid medication. This was followed seven weeks later by CSA restrictions for hydrocodone combination products, the leading opioids on the market. Using regression discontinuity design (RDD) models, based on the timing of the (up-)scheduling changes, to explore spillover effects, we find that tightening prescribing restrictions on one opioid reduces its use, but increases prescribing of close competitors, leading to no reduction in total opioid prescriptions.This suggests that supply restrictions are not effective in reducing opioid prescribing the presence of close substitutes that remain unrestricted.
期刊介绍：
This journal seeks articles related to the economics of health and medical care. Its scope will include the following topics:
Production and supply of health services;
Demand and utilization of health services;
Financing of health services;
Determinants of health, including investments in health and risky health behaviors;
Economic consequences of ill-health;
Behavioral models of demanders, suppliers and other health care agencies;
Evaluation of policy interventions that yield economic insights;
Efficiency and distributional aspects of health policy;
and such other topics as the Editors may deem appropriate.
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