Populism and De Facto Central Bank Independence.

IF 4.2 1区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE Comparative Political Studies Pub Date : 2023-07-01 Epub Date: 2022-11-17 DOI:10.1177/00104140221139513
Michael Gavin, Mark Manger
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Abstract

Although central bank independence is a core tenet of monetary policy-making, it remains politically contested: In many emerging markets, populist governments are in frequent public conflict with the central bank. At other times, the same governments profess to respect the monetary authority's independence. We model this conflict drawing on the crisis bargaining literature. Our model predicts that populist politicians will often bring a nominally independent central bank to heel without having to change its legal status. To provide evidence, we build a new data set of public pressure on central banks by classifying over 9000 analyst reports using machine learning. We find that populist politicians are more likely than non-populists to exert public pressure on the central bank, unless checked by financial markets, and also more likely to obtain interest rate concessions. Our findings underscore that de jure does not equal de facto central bank independence in the face of populist pressures.

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民粹主义与事实上的中央银行独立。
尽管中央银行的独立性是货币政策制定的核心原则,但它在政治上仍有争议:在许多新兴市场,民粹主义政府经常与中央银行公开冲突。而在另一些时候,这些政府又声称尊重货币当局的独立性。我们借鉴危机讨价还价的文献对这种冲突进行建模。我们的模型预测,民粹主义政客往往会让名义上独立的中央银行屈服,而无需改变其法律地位。为了提供证据,我们利用机器学习对 9000 多份分析师报告进行了分类,从而建立了一个新的数据集,用以说明公众对中央银行施加的压力。我们发现,民粹主义政治家比非民粹主义政治家更有可能对中央银行施加公众压力,除非受到金融市场的制衡,而且也更有可能获得利率让步。我们的研究结果强调,面对民粹主义压力,法律上的央行独立性并不等于事实上的央行独立性。
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来源期刊
Comparative Political Studies
Comparative Political Studies POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
8.40
自引率
4.00%
发文量
69
期刊介绍: Comparative Political Studies is a journal of social and political science which publishes scholarly work on comparative politics at both the cross-national and intra-national levels. We are particularly interested in articles which have an innovative theoretical argument and are based on sound and original empirical research. We also encourage submissions about comparative methodology, particularly when methodological arguments are closely linked with substantive issues in the field.
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