{"title":"Consent for Medical Treatment: What is 'Reasonable'?","authors":"Abeezar Ismail Sarela","doi":"10.1007/s10728-023-00466-8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The General Medical Council (GMC) instructs doctors to act 'reasonably' in obtaining consent from patients. However, the GMC does not explain what it means to be reasonable: it is left to doctors to figure out the substance of this instruction. The GMC relies on the Supreme Court's judgment in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board; and it can be assumed that the judges' idea of reasonability is adopted. The aim of this paper is to flesh out this idea of reasonability. This idea is commonly personified as the audience that has to be satisfied by the doctor's justification for offering, or withholding, certain treatments and related information. In case law, this audience shifted from a reasonable doctor to a 'reasonable person in the patient's position'; and Montgomery expands the audience to include 'particular' patients, too. Senior judges have clarified that the reasonable person is a normative ideal, and not a sociological construct; but they do not set out the characteristics of this ideal. John Rawls has conceived the reasonable person-ideal as one that pursues fair terms of co-operation with other members of society. An alternative ideal can be inferred from the feminist ethic of care. However, the reasonable patient from Montgomery does not align with either theoretical ideal; but, instead, is an entirely rational being. Such a conception conflicts with both real-life constraints on rationality and the doctor's duty to care for the patient, and it challenges the practice of medicine.</p>","PeriodicalId":46740,"journal":{"name":"Health Care Analysis","volume":" ","pages":"47-62"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10901930/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Health Care Analysis","FirstCategoryId":"3","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10728-023-00466-8","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2023/8/19 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
The General Medical Council (GMC) instructs doctors to act 'reasonably' in obtaining consent from patients. However, the GMC does not explain what it means to be reasonable: it is left to doctors to figure out the substance of this instruction. The GMC relies on the Supreme Court's judgment in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board; and it can be assumed that the judges' idea of reasonability is adopted. The aim of this paper is to flesh out this idea of reasonability. This idea is commonly personified as the audience that has to be satisfied by the doctor's justification for offering, or withholding, certain treatments and related information. In case law, this audience shifted from a reasonable doctor to a 'reasonable person in the patient's position'; and Montgomery expands the audience to include 'particular' patients, too. Senior judges have clarified that the reasonable person is a normative ideal, and not a sociological construct; but they do not set out the characteristics of this ideal. John Rawls has conceived the reasonable person-ideal as one that pursues fair terms of co-operation with other members of society. An alternative ideal can be inferred from the feminist ethic of care. However, the reasonable patient from Montgomery does not align with either theoretical ideal; but, instead, is an entirely rational being. Such a conception conflicts with both real-life constraints on rationality and the doctor's duty to care for the patient, and it challenges the practice of medicine.
期刊介绍：
Health Care Analysis is a journal that promotes dialogue and debate about conceptual and normative issues related to health and health care, including health systems, healthcare provision, health law, public policy and health, professional health practice, health services organization and decision-making, and health-related education at all levels of clinical medicine, public health and global health. Health Care Analysis seeks to support the conversation between philosophy and policy, in particular illustrating the importance of conceptual and normative analysis to health policy, practice and research. As such, papers accepted for publication are likely to analyse philosophical questions related to health, health care or health policy that focus on one or more of the following: aims or ends, theories, frameworks, concepts, principles, values or ideology. All styles of theoretical analysis are welcome providing that they illuminate conceptual or normative issues and encourage debate between those interested in health, philosophy and policy. Papers must be rigorous, but should strive for accessibility – with care being taken to ensure that their arguments and implications are plain to a broad academic and international audience. In addition to purely theoretical papers, papers grounded in empirical research or case-studies are very welcome so long as they explore the conceptual or normative implications of such work. Authors are encouraged, where possible, to have regard to the social contexts of the issues they are discussing, and all authors should ensure that they indicate the ‘real world’ implications of their work. Health Care Analysis publishes contributions from philosophers, lawyers, social scientists, healthcare educators, healthcare professionals and administrators, and other health-related academics and policy analysts.
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