Reforming the Medicare Part D Benefit Design: Financial Implications for Beneficiaries, Private Plans, Drug Manufacturers, and the Federal Government.

IF 3.3 3区 医学 Q1 HEALTH CARE SCIENCES & SERVICES Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI:10.1215/03616878-10041233
Erin Trish, Katrina M Kaiser, Jeanai Celestin, Geoffrey Joyce
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Abstract

Context: Reforming the Medicare Part D program-which provides prescription drug coverage to 49 million beneficiaries-has emerged as a key policy priority.

Methods: The authors evaluate prescription drug claims from a 100% sample of Medicare Part D beneficiaries to evaluate the current spending distribution across different payers for different types of beneficiaries across different benefit phases. They then model how these estimates would change under a proposal to redesign the Medicare Part D standard benefit.

Findings: Spending patterns differ for beneficiaries who do and do not qualify for low-income subsidies. Part D plans face limited liability for total spending under the current standard benefit design, amounting to 36% of total spending for beneficiaries who do not receive low-income subsidies and 28% of total spending for those who do. Proposed reforms would increase plan liability and significantly change the distribution of liability across plans, drug manufacturers, and the federal government.

Conclusions: Though the original goal of the Part D program was to create a market of competing private plans that provide prescription drug coverage to Medicare beneficiaries, the standard benefit design that was included in the original legislation reflected significant political compromises. Reforming the standard benefit design to give plans more skin in the game could significantly affect competition in the market, with differential impact across drug classes and types of beneficiaries.

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改革医疗保险D部分福利设计:对受益人、私人计划、药品制造商和联邦政府的财务影响。
背景:改革医疗保险D部分计划(该计划为4900万受益人提供处方药覆盖)已成为一项关键的政策重点。方法:作者从100%的医疗保险D部分受益人样本中评估处方药索赔,以评估不同类型受益人在不同福利阶段的不同支付方的当前支出分布。然后,他们模拟了在重新设计医疗保险D部分标准福利的提议下,这些估计将如何变化。研究结果:有资格和没有资格获得低收入补贴的受益人的支出模式有所不同。在目前的标准福利设计下,D部分计划面临的总支出责任有限,未领取低收入补贴的受益人占总支出的36%,领取低收入补贴的受益人占总支出的28%。拟议的改革将增加计划责任,并显著改变责任在计划、药品制造商和联邦政府之间的分配。结论:尽管D部分计划的最初目标是创建一个相互竞争的私人计划市场,为医疗保险受益人提供处方药保险,但原始立法中包含的标准福利设计反映了重大的政治妥协。改革标准福利设计,让医保计划更多地参与其中,可能会显著影响市场竞争,对不同药品类别和受益人类型产生不同影响。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.30
自引率
7.10%
发文量
46
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: A leading journal in its field, and the primary source of communication across the many disciplines it serves, the Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law focuses on the initiation, formulation, and implementation of health policy and analyzes the relations between government and health—past, present, and future.
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