EU political conditionality and parties in government: human rights and the quest for Turkish transformation

Abstract

In one of her articles of reference, Heather Grabbe pointed out that most of the phenomena identified in the literature on Europeanisation may also be observed in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). In addition, Grabbe presents the following elements of explanation when considering the influence of European Union (EU) conditionality on governance: (a) the speed of adjustment, (b) the opening up of CEEC elites to the influence of the EU, and (c) the extent of the EU agenda in terms of institutional and political changes. These factors are certainly relevant, but they do not reflect the importance of the partisan dimension for domestic adaptation in response to EU pressures. The analysis of the Turkish case will show precisely that the partisan dimension is an important explanatory variable for domestic change. In complement to the observation of Grabbe, our claim is that the roles of relevant partisan elites have to be highlighted. One aspect relates to the parties in government. Their presence plays a significant role in determining the attitude of the government towards EU conditionality. That said, one should stress the two factors responsible for bringing these partisan elites to power: the voters and the voting system. Accordingly, we will demonstrate that Turkey’s attitude towards EU conditionality varied during the last two electoral cycles, and was largely dependent on the partisan composition of the governments in power. This changing attitude of Turkey has an important impact on the evaluation of Turkish accession by the EU institutions. We will defend the hypotheses according to which internal political changes were not only determined by the EU, but also by the internal partisan factor. The combination of these two factors determined the scope and the limits of Turkish domestic reforms. Turkey is not only exposed to the pressure of the EU alone. As a distinctive set of institutions, the European Council also plays an important role. For example, the European Council instructed Turkey to release from detention Leyla Zana, a Turkish deputy of Kurdish origin. The United Nations is another institution which plays an important role and to which the European Commission refers to. For example, in the case of the return of internally displaced persons in the Kurdish region in Turkey and the relevant recommendation of the UN Secretary