{"title":"Essential Facilities and Trinko: Should Antitrust and Regulation Be Combined?","authors":"T. Brennan","doi":"10.13016/M2YF6P-IDRQ","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I. INTRODUCTION II. COMPARING A TT it reinforced it in granting securities law precedent over antitrust in its 2007 decision in Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing. (12) The implicit assumption in the recent decisions is that regulation and antitrust are substitute methods for controlling market power. In fact, regulation and antitrust are complementary in this context, as well as in others. (13) Absent regulatory constraints on the direct exercise of market power over the local exchange (AT&T) or network elements (Trinko) through monopoly pricing, the regulated firm would have no incentive to subvert competition in related markets. …","PeriodicalId":423100,"journal":{"name":"Federal Communications Law Journal","volume":"29 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Federal Communications Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.13016/M2YF6P-IDRQ","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Abstract
I. INTRODUCTION II. COMPARING A TT it reinforced it in granting securities law precedent over antitrust in its 2007 decision in Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing. (12) The implicit assumption in the recent decisions is that regulation and antitrust are substitute methods for controlling market power. In fact, regulation and antitrust are complementary in this context, as well as in others. (13) Absent regulatory constraints on the direct exercise of market power over the local exchange (AT&T) or network elements (Trinko) through monopoly pricing, the regulated firm would have no incentive to subvert competition in related markets. …
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