On a Partially Verifiable Multi-party Multi-argument Zero-knowledge Proof

Abstract

The term “digital signature” refers to electronic information that is used to identify signatories and indicate that they have signed a document; such information is either attached to or logically combined with a specific electronic document. However, digital signatures entail privacy infringements because it is possible to verify such signatures only when all the data are disclosed to the verifier. Zero-knowledge proofs are considered to be capable of solving this privacy problem. In general, a zero-knowledge proof can be established even if the prover hides the information required in the verification process from the verifier. Zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (ZK-SNARK), a prevalent zero-knowledge proof, has been optimized to generate non-interactive and succinct proofs; nevertheless, the generation of proofs is excessively time consuming, making the application of ZK-SNARK impractical in most scenarios. In this paper, we show that existing cryptographic algorithms, such as a one-way hash function or digital signature, can be combined with a zero knowledge proof. Particularly, we propose the multi-argument zero-knowledge argument (MAZKA) algorithm, which can verify data by exposing only the part to be verified and also verify that the part of data has not been manipulated compared to the original. In addition, the proposed algorithm satisfies the adaptive proof of knowledge, perfect zero-knowledze and combinatorial succinctness conditions.