A Discourse-Theoretical Conception of Practical Reason

Abstract

Contemporary discussions about practical reason or practical rationality invoke four competing views, which, by reference to their historical models, can be named as follows: Aristotelian, Hobbesian, Kantian, and Nietzschean. The subject matter of this chapter is a defence of the Kantian conception of practical rationality in the interpretation of discourse theory. At the core lies the justification and the application of the rules of discourse. An argument consisting of three parts is presented to justify the rules of discourse. The three parts are as follows: a transcendental-pragmatic argument, an argument that takes account of the maximization of individual utility, and an empirical premise addressing an interest in correctness. Within the framework of the problem of application, the chapter outlines a justification of human rights and of the basic institutions of the democratic constitutional state on the basis of discourse theory.