{"title":"A Corrective Justice Account of Disgorgement for Breach of Contract by Analogy to Fiduciary Remedies","authors":"A. Sangiuliano","doi":"10.1017/cjlj.2016.6","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A corrective justice account of a private law remedy attempts to the explain the remedy as giving back to the plaintiff something to which the plaintiff had a prior right that was breached by the defendant's receipt of that thing. It has proven challenging to explain how disgorgement for breach of contract is consistent with corrective justice. This remedy gives to the plaintiff any profit that a defendant received from a third party by breaching a contract with the plaintiff. In this paper, I critique two leading attempts to show how disgorgement for breach of contract is consistent with corrective justice. I argue that these attempts fail, and I suggest that a plausible corrective justice account of disgorgement should be based on something other than the nature of the contractual rights borne by a plaintiff. I then develop an alternative account based on an analogy between disgorgement for breach of contract and disgorgement for breach of fiduciary duty. To do so, I draw on recent scholarship on the consistency of disgorgement for breach of fiduciary with corrective justice and analyze the leading judicial decision on disgorgement for breach of contract by the UK House of Lords in Attorney General v. Blake. I argue that the fiduciary-based account can provide a plausible explanation for how disgorgement effectuates corrective justice by giving back to a plaintiff something to which he had an antecedent right that the defendant violated by profiting from a breach of contract.","PeriodicalId":244583,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2016.6","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
A corrective justice account of a private law remedy attempts to the explain the remedy as giving back to the plaintiff something to which the plaintiff had a prior right that was breached by the defendant's receipt of that thing. It has proven challenging to explain how disgorgement for breach of contract is consistent with corrective justice. This remedy gives to the plaintiff any profit that a defendant received from a third party by breaching a contract with the plaintiff. In this paper, I critique two leading attempts to show how disgorgement for breach of contract is consistent with corrective justice. I argue that these attempts fail, and I suggest that a plausible corrective justice account of disgorgement should be based on something other than the nature of the contractual rights borne by a plaintiff. I then develop an alternative account based on an analogy between disgorgement for breach of contract and disgorgement for breach of fiduciary duty. To do so, I draw on recent scholarship on the consistency of disgorgement for breach of fiduciary with corrective justice and analyze the leading judicial decision on disgorgement for breach of contract by the UK House of Lords in Attorney General v. Blake. I argue that the fiduciary-based account can provide a plausible explanation for how disgorgement effectuates corrective justice by giving back to a plaintiff something to which he had an antecedent right that the defendant violated by profiting from a breach of contract.
纠正司法对私法救济的解释试图将救济解释为将被告收到的东西违反了原告的优先权利的东西还给原告。事实证明,如何解释因违约而被撤销与纠正性正义是一致的具有挑战性。该救济将被告因违反与原告的合同而从第三方获得的任何利润给予原告。在本文中,我批评了两种主要的尝试,以表明违约的没收如何与纠正正义相一致。我认为,这些尝试都失败了,我建议,一个合理的纠正性司法对撤销的解释应该基于原告所承担的合同权利的性质以外的东西。然后,我根据违反合同和违反信义义务之间的类比,开发了另一种解释。为了做到这一点,我借鉴了最近关于违约解除与纠正性正义的一致性的学术研究,并分析了英国上议院在Attorney General v. Blake一案中对违约解除的主要司法判决。我认为,基于受托人的解释可以提供一个合理的解释,说明撤销是如何通过将被告从违约中获利而侵犯了原告的先行权利返还给原告来实现纠正性正义的。