Delay makes a difference: Smart grid resilience under remote meter disconnect attack

Abstract

Modern smart meters commonly provide a service switch which allows remote connection or disconnection (RCD) of electrical service over a utility's communication network. While this feature is valuable for utilities, researchers have raised concerns about possible (ab)use by malicious attackers, noting the high economic cost of blackouts, as well the potential for controlled on-off switching of meters to affect power grid stability, for example by disturbing its frequency. However, while security concerns have been identified, little work has been done to develop and assess concrete countermeasures that are specific to these attacks. In this paper, we design novel randomized time delay countermeasures for smart meter RCD attacks, and demonstrate their effectiveness under sophisticated attack scenarios. We show that even if an attacker successfully issues malicious RCD commands, a well-designed time delay countermeasure makes the smart grid more resilient by: 1) preventing rapid changes in overall system load; and 2) providing time for a utility to potentially detect and stop an attack in progress. In particular, we demonstrate that a geometric delay mechanism can greatly reduce the magnitude of an attack with little impact on a utility's day-to-day operations.