Cyberattack Resilient Control for Power Electronics Dominated Grid with Minimal Communication

Abstract

Once a cyberattack sabotages the integrity of the supervisory layer, commands including active and reactive power setpoints issued by this layer could not be trusted anymore, whereas the distributed energy resources (DERs) must autonomously stay supplying the loads across the grid to prevent cascading failures. In this paper, a comprehensive cyberattack resilient control framework is proposed. After an effective attack on the supervisory layer is detected, the entire grid is clustered into the predefined boundaries. The confined communications within the shaped-up clusters certifies the minimal communications. To ensure compliance with grid integration standards like IEEE 1547, the proposed distributed control framework identifies the physical formation of the grid via pseudo random binary sequence impedance identification (PRBSII) technique and reacts accordingly to support the voltage across the grid to keep it within the predefined boundaries. The proposed cyberattack resilient control framework is validated with simulation under various case studies.