OLA after Single Point of Entry: Has Anything Changed?

S. Lubben
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

This "white paper," written for the Roosevelt Institute, looks at the Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority, as currently conceived of by regulators. The existence of OLA is crucial to the idea that the Dodd-Frank Act has actually ended "too big to fail." Since financial institutions remain very big, it is up to OLA to provide a means for them to fail. The real question is whether OLA will work and, as OLA was originally presented, there were good reasons for doubt.The FDIC has figured out a clever way to avoid the problems with OLA. Under the new "single point of entry" approach, only the holding company would be placed in OLA, and the FDIC would then continue to prop up the operating subsidiaries, wherever located. The new question is: Will single point of entry work?This short essay explores this question and what remains to be done to create a workable bankruptcy system for global banks. In short, I argue that while single point of entry is a great improvement, it still has its potential faults, and the excitement over it obscures many lingering questions. And nothing has been done to improve the ability of chapter 11 to handle a large financial institution, despite the fact that OLA is only supposed to "backstop" the normal bankruptcy process.
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单点进入后的OLA:有什么变化吗?
这份为罗斯福研究所撰写的“白皮书”着眼于监管机构目前设想的《多德-弗兰克有序清算授权法》(Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority)。对于《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)实际上已经结束了“太大而不能倒”的观点,OLA的存在至关重要。由于金融机构仍然非常庞大,因此要由OLA为它们提供破产的手段。真正的问题是,法律法规是否会起作用,正如法律法规最初提出的那样,有充分的理由怀疑。FDIC想出了一个聪明的办法来避免OLA的问题。在新的“单点进入”方法下,只有控股公司将被置于OLA中,然后FDIC将继续支持运营子公司,无论其位于何处。新的问题是:单点入境有效吗?这篇短文探讨了这个问题,以及为全球银行创建一个可行的破产体系还需要做些什么。简而言之,我认为,虽然单点进入是一个巨大的进步,但它仍然有其潜在的缺陷,对它的兴奋掩盖了许多挥之不去的问题。而且,尽管《破产法》只应该“支持”正常的破产程序,但也没有采取任何措施来提高《破产法》第11章处理大型金融机构的能力。
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