Will Nasdaq's Diversity Rules Harm Investors?

J. Fried
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

In December 2020, Nasdaq asked the Securities and Exchange Commission to approve new diversity rules. The aim is for most Nasdaq-listed firms to have at least one director self-identifying as female and another self-identifying as an underrepresented minority or LGBTQ+. While Nasdaq claims these rules will benefit investors, the empirical evidence provides little support for the claim that gender or ethnic diversity in the boardroom increases shareholder value. In fact, rigorous scholarship—much of it by leading female economists—suggests that increasing board diversity can actually lead to lower share prices. Adoption of Nasdaq’s proposed rules would thus generate substantial risks for investors.
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纳斯达克的多元化规则会伤害投资者吗?
2020年12月,纳斯达克要求美国证券交易委员会批准新的多样性规则。其目标是让大多数在纳斯达克上市的公司至少有一名董事自认为是女性,另一名自认为是少数族裔或LGBTQ+。尽管纳斯达克声称这些规则将使投资者受益,但经验证据几乎无法支持董事会性别或种族多样性会增加股东价值的说法。事实上,严谨的学术研究——其中大部分是由著名的女性经济学家进行的——表明,增加董事会的多样性实际上会导致股价下跌。因此,采用纳斯达克拟议的规则将给投资者带来巨大风险。
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