Improvement of Internal Control of Anti Money Laundering in State-owned Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Analysis

Abstract

Based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality and from the perspective of internal and external forces, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between state-owned enterprises and external regulators, state-owned enterprise management and anti money laundering risk control department, and studies how to improve the internal control of state-owned enterprises. The results show that the supervision cost of regulators, the social benefits of strict supervision and the utility loss of loose supervision are the main factors that affect the improvement of the internal control system of anti money laundering of state-owned enterprises. In order to solve the connivance attitude of state-owned enterprises, it is necessary to combine punishment mechanism with incentive compensation mechanism, improve social supervision mechanism, and promote self-discipline of state-owned enterprises. These conclusions provide a theoretical reference for state-owned enterprises to improve the internal control of anti money laundering.