Courts Cannot Unknot Congress

Abstract

This chapter highlights five complex member lawsuits against legislative processes which resulted in mixed outcomes for the member-litigants. First is the deficit-reduction case surrounding the 1985 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, known after its sponsors as the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Act (GRH), where plaintiffs ostensibly won back power but Congress opted to delegate again. Second is a multiplaintiff suit against executive enforcement of a base-closing commission decision that required supermajorities to override. This case emphasizes the risk that Congress takes when it delegates power away and does not have an easy mechanism to regain control over processes and outcomes. Third is the Democratic House members' unsuccessful suit against their own chamber's rule that mandated a supermajority in order to raise taxes. Fourth is the landmark challenge of the 1996 Line Item Veto Act that has been used by later courts to more readily dismiss member standing, even as the item veto itself is ruled unconstitutional by private plaintiffs the next year. Fifth is a hybrid group of House members and private organizations against the Senate filibuster, which stopped the Dream Act.