Resource Allocation with Vickrey-Dutch Auctioning Game for C-RAN Fronthaul

Abstract

The network slicing concept divides physical networks into logical networks and abstracts the network resources. With the help of virtualization technologies, these abstracted network resources can be allocated to service providers and resources can dynamically be added to these slices based on users' demands. The infrastructure sharing model with slicing makes it possible for services to lease the resources of the infrastructure provider. This study considers optical network resource allocation from a profit generation perspective with a game, in which service providers bid to lease C-RAN fronthaul paths via auctioning with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves outcomes. The game aims to distribute fronthaul resources with a social-welfare maximizing outcome. Service providers maximize their revenue by predicting user demand and requesting bandwidth resources from the infrastructure provider by bidding in the auction. Users have the option to change their association and switch between the service providers to maximize their utility. The results display that a balanced profit and social welfare trade-off can be achieved in converged optical and mmWave radio networks infrastructure sharing scenario with Vickrey-Dutch auctioning and distributed decision-making.