Timing of Predictions in Dynamic Cheap Talk: Experts vs. Quacks

A. Smirnov, E. Starkov
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a sufficiently general class earlier reports are more credible. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time.
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动态廉价谈话中的预测时机:专家vs庸医
本文研究了存在逆向选择和职业考虑的动态沟通博弈。一个能力为人所知、关心自己声誉的预测者,会根据未来事件的结果选择预测的时机。我们发现,在一个足够普遍的类的所有均衡中,早期的报告更可信。此外,任何报告都会在短期内损害预测者的声誉,之后的报告会招致更大的处罚。另一方面,沉默的预报员的声誉会随着时间的推移而逐渐提高。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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