Missing the Forest for the Trolls

Mark A. Lemley, A. Melamed
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引用次数: 77

Abstract

Trolls are a significant feature of the patent system. They account for a large number of suits, now a majority of all patent assertions in the country and an even higher percentage in the information technology (IT) industries. They win both larger judgments and larger settlements than do “practicing entities” (“PEs”) -- those that practice patents and are not principally in the business of collecting money from others that practice them. And they do so despite complaints that trolls assert weak patents and some evidence that troll patents are more likely to lose in court.Nonetheless, we think the focus on patent trolls obscures a more complex set of challenges confronting the patent system. In this paper, we make three points. First, patent trolls are not a unitary phenomenon. We see at least three different troll business models developing, and those models have different effects on the patent system. Second, patent assertions by practicing entities can create just as many problems as assertions by patent trolls. The nature of many industries obscures some of the costs of those assertions, but that does not mean they are cost-free. In addition, practicing entities are increasingly engaging in “patent privateering,” in which product-producing companies take on many of the attributes of trolls. Put differently, while trolls exploit problems with the patent system, they are not the only ones that do so. Third, many of the problems associated with trolls are in fact problems that stem from the disaggregation of complementary patents into too many different hands. That in turn suggests that groups like Intellectual Ventures might be reducing, not worsening, these problems (though, as we will see, the overall effects are ambiguous), while “patent privateers” that spin off patents in order for others to assert them might make things worse. For this reason, patent reformers and antitrust authorities should worry less about aggregation of patent rights and more about disaggregation of those rights, sometimes accomplished by spinning them out to others.Understanding the economics of patent assertions by both trolls and practicing entities allows us to move beyond labels and the search for “bad actors,” focusing instead on aspects of the patent system itself that give rise to the problems and on specific, objectionable conduct in which both trolls and practicing entities sometimes engage. Patent trolls alone are not the problem; they are a symptom of larger problems with the patent system. Treating the symptom will not solve the problems. In a very real sense, critics have been missing the forest for the trolls. Exposing the larger problems allows us to contemplate changes in patent law that will actually tackle the underlying pathologies of the patent system and the abusive conduct they enable.
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为了巨魔而错过森林
巨魔是专利制度的一个重要特征。它们占了大量的诉讼,现在占全国所有专利主张的大多数,在信息技术(IT)行业中所占的比例甚至更高。与“执业实体”(“pe”)相比,他们赢得了更大的判决和更大的和解。“执业实体”是指那些执业专利的实体,主要不从事向其他执业专利的实体收取资金的业务。尽管有人抱怨喷子主张的专利不够有力,而且有证据表明喷子专利更有可能在法庭上败诉,但他们还是这么做了。尽管如此,我们认为对专利流氓的关注掩盖了专利制度面临的一系列更复杂的挑战。在本文中,我们提出三点。首先,专利流氓不是一个单一的现象。我们看到至少有三种不同的巨魔商业模式正在发展,这些模式对专利制度有不同的影响。其次,执业实体提出的专利主张与专利流氓提出的专利主张一样多。许多行业的性质掩盖了这些主张的一些成本,但这并不意味着它们没有成本。此外,实践实体越来越多地参与“专利私掠”,其中产品生产公司具有许多巨魔的属性。换句话说,尽管巨魔利用了专利制度的问题,但他们并不是唯一这样做的人。第三,与巨魔相关的许多问题实际上是源于互补专利分散到太多不同的人手中。这反过来表明,像Intellectual Ventures这样的组织可能会减少而不是恶化这些问题(尽管,正如我们将看到的,总体效果是模糊的),而“专利私营者”为了让其他人维护它们而剥离专利可能会使事情变得更糟。出于这个原因,专利改革者和反垄断当局不应该太担心专利权的聚合,而应该更多地担心这些权利的分解,有时是通过将它们分拆给其他人来实现的。理解巨魔和实践实体的专利主张的经济学,使我们能够超越标签和寻找“不良行为者”,而是关注专利制度本身产生问题的方面,以及巨魔和实践实体有时参与的具体的、令人反感的行为。专利流氓本身不是问题;它们是专利制度存在的更大问题的一个症状。治标不治本。从一个非常真实的意义上说,评论家们一直在为巨魔而错过森林。揭露更大的问题使我们能够考虑专利法的变化,这些变化将真正解决专利制度的潜在病态及其所导致的滥用行为。
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