Institutional Perfection or Improvement of Imperfect Institutions? An Essay on the Methodological Status of Perfect but Unfeasible Institutional Regimes

Abstract

The paper deals with “perfect institutional regimes” (PIRs), defined as regimes that optimally satisfy a given value (like justice). Assuming that a PIR is unfeasible in the short term to agents willing to achieve it, what reasons do we have to spend time on a PIR? One answer is that knowing about PIRs is interesting enough to warrant an inquiry into the subject, even if it is not likely to change the world. Another is that searching for a PIR helps to set up the principles under which more modest proposals of change are to be evaluated. Another, finally, is that theorizing about a PIR may have a motivational impact: although there are no motivated agents to whom the realization of a PIR is nowadays feasible, talking about it might lead to a change of this scenario.