The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is a multilateral development bank established in 2016 with a mission to improve social and economic outcomes in Asia, by investing in sustainable infrastructure and other productive sectors. By bolstering finance for development, the bank promises improved economic security for its member states, most of which have unmet demand for energy and other infrastructure. The new institution represents, however, a challenge to the international system. Along with a series of other new institutions and platforms for engaging with the developing world, the AIIB marks China’s return to great power status, contributing to global governance alongside the United States of America.
{"title":"Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank","authors":"David Morris","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3638592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3638592","url":null,"abstract":"The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is a multilateral development bank established in 2016 with a mission to improve social and economic outcomes in Asia, by investing in sustainable infrastructure and other productive sectors. By bolstering finance for development, the bank promises improved economic security for its member states, most of which have unmet demand for energy and other infrastructure. The new institution represents, however, a challenge to the international system. Along with a series of other new institutions and platforms for engaging with the developing world, the AIIB marks China’s return to great power status, contributing to global governance alongside the United States of America.","PeriodicalId":165404,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: Politics of International Institutions & Global Governance eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129431890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This submission relates to two key areas of the draft first report of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) on Ireland's 4th periodic report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR):
(1) the domestic application of ICESCR in Ireland;
(2) economic and social rights of persons seeking asylum (international protection) in Ireland.
{"title":"Comments on First Draft of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 4th Periodic Report for Ireland 2020","authors":"L. Thornton","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3610722","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3610722","url":null,"abstract":"This submission relates to two key areas of the draft first report of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) on Ireland's 4th periodic report under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR): <br><br>(1) the domestic application of ICESCR in Ireland;<br><br>(2) economic and social rights of persons seeking asylum (international protection) in Ireland.","PeriodicalId":165404,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: Politics of International Institutions & Global Governance eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114499322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly pervasive and essential to everyday life, enabling apps and various smart devices to autonomous vehicles and medical devices. Yet along with the promise of an increasingly interconnected and responsive Internet of Everything, AI is ushering in a host of legal, social, economic, and cultural challenges. The variety of stakeholders involved – spanning governments, industries, and users around the world – presents unique opportunities and governance questions for how best to facilitate the safe and equitable development, deployment, and use of innovative AI applications. Regulators around the world at the state, national, and international levels are actively considering next steps in regulating this suite of technologies, but with little sense of how their efforts can build on and reinforce one another. This state of affairs points to the need for novel approaches to nested governance, particularly among leading AI powers including the United States, European Union, and China. This Article provides an overview of AI and the numerous challenges it presents with special attention being paid to autonomous vehicles, along with exploring the lessons to be learned from polycentric governance frameworks and how to apply such social science constructs to the world of AI.
{"title":"Governing AI","authors":"Scott J. Shackelford, Rachel Dockery","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3478244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3478244","url":null,"abstract":"Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly pervasive and essential to everyday life, enabling apps and various smart devices to autonomous vehicles and medical devices. Yet along with the promise of an increasingly interconnected and responsive Internet of Everything, AI is ushering in a host of legal, social, economic, and cultural challenges. The variety of stakeholders involved – spanning governments, industries, and users around the world – presents unique opportunities and governance questions for how best to facilitate the safe and equitable development, deployment, and use of innovative AI applications. Regulators around the world at the state, national, and international levels are actively considering next steps in regulating this suite of technologies, but with little sense of how their efforts can build on and reinforce one another. This state of affairs points to the need for novel approaches to nested governance, particularly among leading AI powers including the United States, European Union, and China. This Article provides an overview of AI and the numerous challenges it presents with special attention being paid to autonomous vehicles, along with exploring the lessons to be learned from polycentric governance frameworks and how to apply such social science constructs to the world of AI.","PeriodicalId":165404,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: Politics of International Institutions & Global Governance eJournal","volume":"2009 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120920279","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Greater interdependence is often taken to require more global governance, but the logic requires scrutiny. Cross-border spillovers do not always call for international rules. The canonical cases for global governance are based on two sets of circumstances: global commons and “beggar-thy-neighbor” (BTN) policies. The world economy is not a global commons (outside of climate change), and much of our current discussions deal with policies that are not true BTNs. Some of these are beggar-thyself policies; others may produce domestic benefits, addressing real market distortions or legitimate social objectives. The case for global governance in such policies, I will argue, is very weak, and possibly outweighed by the risk that global oversight or regulation would backfire. While these policy domains are certainly rife with failures, such failures arise not from weaknesses of global governance, but from failures of national governance and cannot be fixed through international agreements or multilateral cooperation. I advocate a mode of global governance that I call “democracy-enhancing global governance,” to be distinguished from “globalization-enhancing global governance.”
{"title":"Putting Global Governance in its Place","authors":"D. Rodrik","doi":"10.3386/w26213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26213","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Greater interdependence is often taken to require more global governance, but the logic requires scrutiny. Cross-border spillovers do not always call for international rules. The canonical cases for global governance are based on two sets of circumstances: global commons and “beggar-thy-neighbor” (BTN) policies. The world economy is not a global commons (outside of climate change), and much of our current discussions deal with policies that are not true BTNs. Some of these are beggar-thyself policies; others may produce domestic benefits, addressing real market distortions or legitimate social objectives. The case for global governance in such policies, I will argue, is very weak, and possibly outweighed by the risk that global oversight or regulation would backfire. While these policy domains are certainly rife with failures, such failures arise not from weaknesses of global governance, but from failures of national governance and cannot be fixed through international agreements or multilateral cooperation. I advocate a mode of global governance that I call “democracy-enhancing global governance,” to be distinguished from “globalization-enhancing global governance.”","PeriodicalId":165404,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: Politics of International Institutions & Global Governance eJournal","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115204643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Published on Economic Sociology: The European Electronic Newsletter, 2019, 21 (1): 22–32. In 2014, the Chinese government proposed to build a social credit system (SCS) to better collect and evaluate citizens’ creditworthiness and grant rewards and punishments based on one’s social credit. Since then, various SCS pilots have been enacted. While current media and scholars often perceive SCS as a single and unified system, this paper argues that there are in fact multiple SCSs in China. I identify four main types of SCS and articulate the relationships among them. Each SCS has different assumptions, operationalizations, and implementations. China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, and the macroeconomic management agency, the National Development and Reform Commission, are the two most important actors in the design and implementation of the multiple SCSs. Yet their distinctive views about what “credit” is and what an SCS should be produced great tensions on the SCS landscape. I also historicize current SCSs and show that many elements and assumptions of SCSs can be traced back to a broader political history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Finally, I propose an alternative theoretical framework to understand Chinese SCSs as a symbolic system with performative power that is more than a simple repressive and direct political project.
{"title":"Multiple Social Credit Systems in China","authors":"C. Liu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3423057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3423057","url":null,"abstract":"Published on Economic Sociology: The European Electronic Newsletter, 2019, 21 (1): 22–32. In 2014, the Chinese government proposed to build a social credit system (SCS) to better collect and evaluate citizens’ creditworthiness and grant rewards and punishments based on one’s social credit. Since then, various SCS pilots have been enacted. While current media and scholars often perceive SCS as a single and unified system, this paper argues that there are in fact multiple SCSs in China. I identify four main types of SCS and articulate the relationships among them. Each SCS has different assumptions, operationalizations, and implementations. China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, and the macroeconomic management agency, the National Development and Reform Commission, are the two most important actors in the design and implementation of the multiple SCSs. Yet their distinctive views about what “credit” is and what an SCS should be produced great tensions on the SCS landscape. I also historicize current SCSs and show that many elements and assumptions of SCSs can be traced back to a broader political history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Finally, I propose an alternative theoretical framework to understand Chinese SCSs as a symbolic system with performative power that is more than a simple repressive and direct political project.","PeriodicalId":165404,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: Politics of International Institutions & Global Governance eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121470431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a time of uncertainty in the international order, scholars of international relations are directing increased attention to both systemic power transitions and contestation of global norms and institutions. Although similar real-world dynamics are motivating both of these scholarly trends, there has been little cross-pollination among scholars studying power at a systemic and structural level and those studying power at a normative and discursive level. This paper merges insights from these literatures to explain how states’ contestation of the normative components of the international order shapes global politics during times of power transition. It does so by introducing the theoretical concept of contestation space in international regimes. This concept modifies a basic rational choice bargaining model to depict how new equilibria regimes are formed under conditions of contestation over the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that compose international regimes. The theoretical concept of contestation space shows how ambiguity, omission, and contradiction in complex international agreements make room for contested understandings of bargaining outcomes. This contestation space facilitates the establishment of new equilibria in international regimes, but it can also act as a source of misperception and conflict during power transitions. This theory thus contributes to a burgeoning research program in the study of realpolitik that analyzes the broad range of instruments of power states employ and emphasizes the ways that hierarchy operates in international relations.
{"title":"A Theory of Contestation Space in International Regimes","authors":"Rachel Esplin Odell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3369619","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3369619","url":null,"abstract":"In a time of uncertainty in the international order, scholars of international relations are directing increased attention to both systemic power transitions and contestation of global norms and institutions. Although similar real-world dynamics are motivating both of these scholarly trends, there has been little cross-pollination among scholars studying power at a systemic and structural level and those studying power at a normative and discursive level. This paper merges insights from these literatures to explain how states’ contestation of the normative components of the international order shapes global politics during times of power transition. It does so by introducing the theoretical concept of contestation space in international regimes. This concept modifies a basic rational choice bargaining model to depict how new equilibria regimes are formed under conditions of contestation over the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that compose international regimes. The theoretical concept of contestation space shows how ambiguity, omission, and contradiction in complex international agreements make room for contested understandings of bargaining outcomes. This contestation space facilitates the establishment of new equilibria in international regimes, but it can also act as a source of misperception and conflict during power transitions. This theory thus contributes to a burgeoning research program in the study of realpolitik that analyzes the broad range of instruments of power states employ and emphasizes the ways that hierarchy operates in international relations.","PeriodicalId":165404,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: Politics of International Institutions & Global Governance eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122002041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates relationship between institutional quality and economic performance in Pakistan using the Johansen-Juselius cointegration technique and the Granger causality test. The study results indicate that Institutions and growth are cointegrated and thus exhibit a reliable long run relationship. The Granger causality test findings indicate that the causality between Institutions and growth is uni-directional.However, there is no short run causality from Institutions to growth and vice versa. Therefore, as a policy implication that institutional quality may cause to the sustainable increase in country’s income in the long run, and success of any policy could be influenced by the soundness of institutions.
{"title":"The Causal Relationship Between Institutions and Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation for Pakistan Economy","authors":"D. Siddiqui, Q. M. Ahmed","doi":"10.5296/IEB.V5I1.13918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5296/IEB.V5I1.13918","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates relationship between institutional quality and economic performance in Pakistan using the Johansen-Juselius cointegration technique and the Granger causality test. The study results indicate that Institutions and growth are cointegrated and thus exhibit a reliable long run relationship. The Granger causality test findings indicate that the causality between Institutions and growth is uni-directional.However, there is no short run causality from Institutions to growth and vice versa. Therefore, as a policy implication that institutional quality may cause to the sustainable increase in country’s income in the long run, and success of any policy could be influenced by the soundness of institutions.","PeriodicalId":165404,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: Politics of International Institutions & Global Governance eJournal","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121220373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Author(s): Lee, Melissa M; Matanock, Aila M | Editor(s): Kelley, Judith; Simmons, Beth | Abstract: Global performance indicators can help leaders overcome rent-seeking politicians or competition-fearing monopolies by empowering allies, shaming bureaucrats, mobilizing publics, and promising to attract investment.19 External validationn...
{"title":"Third-Party Policymakers and the Limits of the Influence of Indicators","authors":"Melissa M. Lee, Aila M. Matanock","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3205699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3205699","url":null,"abstract":"Author(s): Lee, Melissa M; Matanock, Aila M | Editor(s): Kelley, Judith; Simmons, Beth | Abstract: Global performance indicators can help leaders overcome rent-seeking politicians or competition-fearing monopolies by empowering allies, shaming bureaucrats, mobilizing publics, and promising to attract investment.19 External validationn...","PeriodicalId":165404,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: Politics of International Institutions & Global Governance eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128185889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we explore the factors that determine the level at which World Bank projects are implemented. In particular, focusing on the importance of informational asymmetry between levels of government, we empirically assess whether this choice is influenced by the relative importance of local information at the recipient country level. Using an AidData dataset that provides information on more than 5800 World Bank projects for the period 1995-2014, and controlling for characteristics at both country and project level, we find that transparency does influence the probability that a project is implemented locally rather than nationally. More specifically, a one standard deviation decline in transparency increases the probability that a World Bank project will be implemented locally by 3 percent.
{"title":"Allocation of Implementing Power: Evidence from World Bank Projects","authors":"S. Marchesi, T. Masi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3315450","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3315450","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we explore the factors that determine the level at which World Bank projects are implemented. In particular, focusing on the importance of informational asymmetry between levels of government, we empirically assess whether this choice is influenced by the relative importance of local information at the recipient country level. Using an AidData dataset that provides information on more than 5800 World Bank projects for the period 1995-2014, and controlling for characteristics at both country and project level, we find that transparency does influence the probability that a project is implemented locally rather than nationally. More specifically, a one standard deviation decline in transparency increases the probability that a World Bank project will be implemented locally by 3 percent.","PeriodicalId":165404,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: Politics of International Institutions & Global Governance eJournal","volume":"148 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123260155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Chiara Broccolini, G. Lotti, A. Maffioli, A. Presbitero, Rodolfo Stucchi
This study uses loan-level data on syndicated lending to a large sample of developing countries between 1993 and 2017 to estimate the mobilization effects of multilateral development banks (MDBs), that is, their ability to crowd-in capital from private creditors. Controlling for a large set of fixed effects, the paper shows evidence of positive and significant mobilization effects of multilateral lending on the size of bank inflows. The number of lenders and the average maturity of syndicated loans also increase. These effects are present not only on impact but last for up to three years and are not offset by a decline in bond financing. There is no evidence of anticipation effects, and the results are robust to numerous tests controlling for the role of confounding factors and unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, the results are economically sizable, indicating that MDBs can mobilize about seven dollars in bank credit over a three-year period for each dollar invested.
{"title":"Mobilization Effects of Multilateral Development Banks","authors":"Chiara Broccolini, G. Lotti, A. Maffioli, A. Presbitero, Rodolfo Stucchi","doi":"10.18235/0001318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18235/0001318","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This study uses loan-level data on syndicated lending to a large sample of developing countries between 1993 and 2017 to estimate the mobilization effects of multilateral development banks (MDBs), that is, their ability to crowd-in capital from private creditors. Controlling for a large set of fixed effects, the paper shows evidence of positive and significant mobilization effects of multilateral lending on the size of bank inflows. The number of lenders and the average maturity of syndicated loans also increase. These effects are present not only on impact but last for up to three years and are not offset by a decline in bond financing. There is no evidence of anticipation effects, and the results are robust to numerous tests controlling for the role of confounding factors and unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, the results are economically sizable, indicating that MDBs can mobilize about seven dollars in bank credit over a three-year period for each dollar invested.","PeriodicalId":165404,"journal":{"name":"International Institutions: Politics of International Institutions & Global Governance eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122952332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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