Disassembling Software Instruction Types through Impedance Side-channel Analysis

Abstract

Recent attacks on embedded devices emphasize the pressing need for a solution to protect against malware and maintain software privacy. Although there are several anomaly detection mechanisms, side-channel signals have emerged as being very effective since they can monitor malicious activities or the secure execution of programs without disrupting the system under observation. Existing side-channel-based instruction monitors investigate a device’s power traces and electromagnetic leaks. However, they have several limitations, including device modifications and complex deployment requirements. In this paper, we explore the prospect of impedance side-channel for disassembling software instruction types offline. Our implementation results from the ATmega328P micro-controller demonstrate that we can use the impedance side-channel to disassemble software instruction types, which can be used for anomaly monitoring, software integrity verification, virus detection, and even counterfeit devices, with a very low false-positive rate (0.40%) and high detection accuracy (98.6%).