CoKey: fast token-based cooperative cryptography

Julian Horsch, Sascha Wessel, C. Eckert
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Keys for symmetric cryptography are usually stored in RAM and therefore susceptible to various attacks, ranging from simple buffer overflows to leaks via cold boot, DMA or side channels. A common approach to mitigate such attacks is to move the keys to an external cryptographic token. For low-throughput applications like asymmetric signature generation, the performance of these tokens is sufficient. For symmetric, data-intensive use cases, like disk encryption on behalf of the host, the connecting interface to the token often is a serious bottleneck. In order to overcome this problem, we present CoKey, a novel concept for partially moving symmetric cryptography out of the host into a trusted detachable token. CoKey combines keys from both entities and securely encrypts initialization vectors on the token which are then used in the cryptographic operations on the host. This forces host and token to cooperate during the whole encryption and decryption process. Our concept strongly and efficiently binds encrypted data on the host to the specific token used for their encryption, while still allowing for fast operation. We implemented the concept using Linux hosts and the USB armory, a USB thumb drive sized ARM computer, as detachable crypto token. Our detailed performance evaluation shows that our prototype is easily fast enough even for data-intensive and performance-critical use cases like full disk encryption, thus effectively improving security for symmetric cryptography in a usable way.
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CoKey:快速的基于令牌的协作加密
对称加密的密钥通常存储在RAM中,因此容易受到各种攻击,从简单的缓冲区溢出到通过冷启动、DMA或侧通道泄漏。缓解此类攻击的一种常用方法是将密钥移动到外部加密令牌中。对于像非对称签名生成这样的低吞吐量应用程序,这些令牌的性能就足够了。对于对称的、数据密集型的用例,比如代表主机的磁盘加密,令牌的连接接口通常是一个严重的瓶颈。为了克服这个问题,我们提出了CoKey,这是一个将部分对称加密从主机移到可信可拆卸令牌的新概念。CoKey结合来自两个实体的密钥,并安全地加密令牌上的初始化向量,然后在主机上的加密操作中使用。这迫使主机和令牌在整个加密和解密过程中合作。我们的概念强大而有效地将主机上的加密数据绑定到用于加密的特定令牌,同时仍然允许快速操作。我们使用Linux主机和USB军械库(一个USB拇指驱动器大小的ARM计算机)作为可拆卸的加密令牌来实现这个概念。我们详细的性能评估表明,即使对于数据密集型和性能关键的用例(如全磁盘加密),我们的原型也足够快,从而以可用的方式有效地提高了对称加密的安全性。
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ShieldFS: a self-healing, ransomware-aware filesystem CoKey: fast token-based cooperative cryptography Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference on Computer Security Applications Reliably determining data leakage in the presence of strong attackers Code obfuscation against symbolic execution attacks
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