Commission production contracts with revenue sharing for a capacitated manufacturer and multiple retailers

Xiyang Hou, Yongjiang Guo, P. Cao
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Abstract

In this paper, we consider a manufacturer with limited production capacity producing multiple kinds of independent products, such that each kind of product is sold by a distinct retailer who is offered a commission production contract with revenue sharing by the manufacturer. We study the contract in the centralised and decentralised systems respectively. Under certain conditions of price elasticities and cost fractions, we show the uniqueness of optimal revenue share for all products. Moreover, by comparing both systems with same capacity constraint, we find that at least one retailer's price in the centralised system is higher than that of the decentralised system, and the order quantity for that retailer is lower under some conditions. As a consequence, the decentralised system's profit is always higher than the centralised system's profit under that condition. Also, the retailers' optimal prices (resp. order quantities) are increasing (resp. decreasing) in production capacity of the manufacturer, whereas the manufacturer's expected profit is increasing in its production capacity in both systems. Finally, we conduct numerical study to justify our theoretical results, and examine the effect of processing cost on both systems' profits, and the effect of demand uncertainty on the optimal prices and order quantities. [Received 22 May 2018; Accepted 28 October 2019]
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一个有生产能力的制造商和多个零售商的委托生产合同的收益分成
在本文中,我们考虑一个生产能力有限的制造商生产多种独立的产品,每种产品由不同的零售商销售,零售商提供委托生产合同,制造商分享收益。我们分别研究了中心化系统和去中心化系统中的契约。在一定的价格弹性和成本分数条件下,我们证明了所有产品的最优收益份额的唯一性。此外,通过比较具有相同容量约束的两种系统,我们发现在某些条件下,集中式系统中至少有一个零售商的价格高于分散式系统,并且该零售商的订货量更低。因此,在这种情况下,去中心化系统的利润总是高于集中化系统的利润。同时,零售商的最优价格(p < 0)。订单数量正在增加(见图表)。在两个系统中,制造商的生产能力都在下降,而制造商的预期利润在其生产能力中都在增加。最后,我们通过数值研究来证明我们的理论结果,并检验了加工成本对两个系统利润的影响,以及需求不确定性对最优价格和订单数量的影响。[收到2018年5月22日;接受2019年10月28日]
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