{"title":"Category Errors and Executive Power","authors":"J. Adler","doi":"10.25148/LAWREV.11.2.8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the context of implementing the Affordable Care Act and the Clean Air Act, the Obama Administration has asserted not only the authority to determine when, and how stringently, to enforce relevant provisions, but also the authority to waive or delay legal obligations enacted by Congress. These actions have prompted accusations that the Administration is exceeding the proper bounds of executive authority. The ensuing debate – and litigation – over these actions has generated a good deal of confusion about the nature and scope of executive power. Commentators have often misunderstood or mischaracterized the nature of the acts taken and their potential legal justifications, blurring the distinction between permissible executive discretion over matters of enforcement with broader discretion to adjust legal benefits and burdens. The purpose of this brief essay, prepared for a symposium at the Florida International University Law School, is to provide some clarity in the muddled discussion over executive power. Specifically, the aim is to help clarify what sorts of actions taken by the executive branch can be properly characterized as “enforcement” actions – where the President’s inherent authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion applies – and what sorts of actions do not.","PeriodicalId":300333,"journal":{"name":"FIU Law Review","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"FIU Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.25148/LAWREV.11.2.8","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In the context of implementing the Affordable Care Act and the Clean Air Act, the Obama Administration has asserted not only the authority to determine when, and how stringently, to enforce relevant provisions, but also the authority to waive or delay legal obligations enacted by Congress. These actions have prompted accusations that the Administration is exceeding the proper bounds of executive authority. The ensuing debate – and litigation – over these actions has generated a good deal of confusion about the nature and scope of executive power. Commentators have often misunderstood or mischaracterized the nature of the acts taken and their potential legal justifications, blurring the distinction between permissible executive discretion over matters of enforcement with broader discretion to adjust legal benefits and burdens. The purpose of this brief essay, prepared for a symposium at the Florida International University Law School, is to provide some clarity in the muddled discussion over executive power. Specifically, the aim is to help clarify what sorts of actions taken by the executive branch can be properly characterized as “enforcement” actions – where the President’s inherent authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion applies – and what sorts of actions do not.
在实施《平价医疗法案》(Affordable Care Act)和《清洁空气法案》(Clean Air Act)的过程中,奥巴马政府不仅主张有权决定何时、以何种严格程度执行相关规定,还主张有权放弃或推迟国会制定的法律义务。这些行动引起了对行政当局越权的指控。随后围绕这些行为展开的辩论和诉讼,使人们对行政权力的性质和范围产生了很大的困惑。评论家经常误解或错误地描述所采取行为的性质及其潜在的法律理由,模糊了在执行事项上允许的行政自由裁量权与调整法律利益和负担的更广泛的自由裁量权之间的区别。这篇短文是为佛罗里达国际大学法学院(Florida International University Law School)的一个研讨会准备的,目的是为有关行政权力的混乱讨论提供一些清晰的信息。具体来说,其目的是帮助澄清行政部门采取的哪些行动可以被恰当地定性为“执法”行动——在这种情况下,总统行使起诉自由裁量权的固有权力适用——以及哪些行动不适用。