{"title":"Multi-service networks: flow configuration, pricing and incentive Stackelberg strategies","authors":"G. M. Dimirovski, Yuan Jing, K. Sohraby","doi":"10.1109/TELSKS.2005.1572122","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"High-speed communication networks, such as B-ISDN and Internet, allow several types of network traffic to coexist in the same transmission medium and belong to the category of multi-service networks. Several new results on flow configuration, pricing and routing are presented in addition to overviews of relevant previous works. These derived by making use of the concepts Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality and Stackelberg strategies borrowed from game theory. These are highlighted by means of illustrative examples. It is claimed the control-theoretic view on incentives in the theory of non-cooperative games provides for tools to solve various control and management problems in high-speed communication networks hence many QoS problems too.","PeriodicalId":422115,"journal":{"name":"TELSIKS 2005 - 2005 uth International Conference on Telecommunication in ModernSatellite, Cable and Broadcasting Services","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2005-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"TELSIKS 2005 - 2005 uth International Conference on Telecommunication in ModernSatellite, Cable and Broadcasting Services","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/TELSKS.2005.1572122","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
High-speed communication networks, such as B-ISDN and Internet, allow several types of network traffic to coexist in the same transmission medium and belong to the category of multi-service networks. Several new results on flow configuration, pricing and routing are presented in addition to overviews of relevant previous works. These derived by making use of the concepts Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality and Stackelberg strategies borrowed from game theory. These are highlighted by means of illustrative examples. It is claimed the control-theoretic view on incentives in the theory of non-cooperative games provides for tools to solve various control and management problems in high-speed communication networks hence many QoS problems too.