{"title":"Ordering Infinite Utility Streams: Efficiency, Continuity, and No Impatience","authors":"J. Alcantud, R. Dubey","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2404912","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study two related versions of the no-impatience postulate in the context of transitive and reflexive relations on infinite utility streams which are not necessarily complete. Both are excluded by the traditional (weak) anonymity axiom. We show explicit social welfare relations satisfying Strong Pareto and the weaker version of no-impatience that are compatible with continuity in all the traditional topologies in this field. However the stronger version of no-impatience is violated by all lower semi-continuous (in the sup or Campbell topologies) social welfare relations satisfying the Weak Pareto axiom.","PeriodicalId":316250,"journal":{"name":"SRPN: Social Economics (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"SRPN: Social Economics (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2404912","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
We study two related versions of the no-impatience postulate in the context of transitive and reflexive relations on infinite utility streams which are not necessarily complete. Both are excluded by the traditional (weak) anonymity axiom. We show explicit social welfare relations satisfying Strong Pareto and the weaker version of no-impatience that are compatible with continuity in all the traditional topologies in this field. However the stronger version of no-impatience is violated by all lower semi-continuous (in the sup or Campbell topologies) social welfare relations satisfying the Weak Pareto axiom.