Distributed Data Recovery Against False Data Injection Attacks in DC Microgrids

Abstract

With the development of information and communications technology (ICT) in DC microgrids (DCmGs), the threat of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) is becoming more and more serious. However, the existing literature mainly focuses on the detection and identification of FDIAs in DCmGs, while the data recovery after the perception of FDIAs has never been thor-oughly investigated yet. In this paper, we propose a distributed data recovery scheme to eliminate the adverse impact caused by FDIAs in DCmGs. Firstly, by observing the point of common coupling (PCC) voltage under FDIAs, the injected constant bias can be roughly estimated. In order to obtain the precise constant bias, the mean filter (MF) is adopted to handle the measurement noises and small oscillations. Then, the estimated precise constant bias is compensated for the communicated signal to eliminate the attack impact. Furthermore, our proposed data recovery scheme, which only needs local information, is fully distributed. Finally, the accuracy and effectiveness of the distributed data recovery scheme are evaluated through systematical hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) experiments.