{"title":"The Role of Public Reason in Obergefell v. Hodges","authors":"R. A. Katz","doi":"10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.13","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Public reason, as developed by John Rawls, is the idea that the “moral or political rules that regulate our common life be, in some sense, justifiable or acceptable to all those persons over whom the rules purport to have authority.” This Essay explores the role that the idea of public reason plays in the opinions of Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court's 2015 landmark decision recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage (SSM). Most notably: Roberts accuses Kennedy of violating public reason by grounding the right to SSM on a sectarian creed, namely, the comprehensive liberalism espoused by John Stuart Mill. Kennedy implicitly reproves citizens who support SSM bans on religious grounds, perhaps gesturing towards a civic duty or etiquette to refrain from supporting laws based solely on one’s creed. Roberts in turn criticizes Kennedy for unfairly applying the demands of public reason to ordinary citizens. In these ways, Roberts and Kennedy act less like exemplars of public reason, the role that Rawls envisions for a supreme court, and more like whistleblowers of others’ violations and misapplications of the idea.","PeriodicalId":300333,"journal":{"name":"FIU Law Review","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"FIU Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.25148/LAWREV.11.1.13","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Public reason, as developed by John Rawls, is the idea that the “moral or political rules that regulate our common life be, in some sense, justifiable or acceptable to all those persons over whom the rules purport to have authority.” This Essay explores the role that the idea of public reason plays in the opinions of Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court's 2015 landmark decision recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage (SSM). Most notably: Roberts accuses Kennedy of violating public reason by grounding the right to SSM on a sectarian creed, namely, the comprehensive liberalism espoused by John Stuart Mill. Kennedy implicitly reproves citizens who support SSM bans on religious grounds, perhaps gesturing towards a civic duty or etiquette to refrain from supporting laws based solely on one’s creed. Roberts in turn criticizes Kennedy for unfairly applying the demands of public reason to ordinary citizens. In these ways, Roberts and Kennedy act less like exemplars of public reason, the role that Rawls envisions for a supreme court, and more like whistleblowers of others’ violations and misapplications of the idea.
约翰·罗尔斯发展的公共理性是这样一种理念,即“规范我们共同生活的道德或政治规则,在某种意义上,对所有这些规则声称对其具有权威的人来说,是合理的或可接受的。”本文探讨了公共理性理念在大法官约翰·罗伯茨(John Roberts)和大法官安东尼·肯尼迪(Anthony Kennedy)在奥贝格费尔诉霍奇斯案(Obergefell v. Hodges)中所扮演的角色。奥贝格费尔诉霍奇斯案是最高法院2015年做出的具有里程碑意义的裁决,承认了同性婚姻的宪法权利。最值得注意的是:罗伯茨指责肯尼迪违反公共理性,将SSM的权利建立在宗派信条之上,即约翰·斯图尔特·密尔所支持的全面自由主义。肯尼迪含蓄地谴责那些基于宗教理由支持SSM禁令的公民,也许是在暗示一种公民责任或礼仪,即不支持完全基于个人信仰的法律。罗伯茨反过来批评肯尼迪不公平地将公共理性的要求应用于普通公民。在这些方面,罗伯茨和肯尼迪的行为不像罗尔斯设想的最高法院中公共理性的典范,而更像是其他人违反和误用这一理念的举报人。