Lawful But Corrupt: Gaming and the Problem of Institutional Corruption in the Private Sector

Malcolm S. Salter
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引用次数: 22

Abstract

This paper describes how the gaming of society’s rules by corporations contributes to the problem of institutional corruption in the world of business. “Gaming” in its various forms involves the use of technically legal means to subvert the intent of society’s rules in order to gain advantage over rivals, maximize reported earnings, maintain high credit ratings, preserve access to capital on favorable terms, and reap personal rewards - just mention several possible motives. It is one of the most corrosive forms of institutional corruption in business. “Institutional corruption” refers to company-sanctioned behavior and relationships that may be lawful but either harm the public interest or weaken the capacity of the institution to achieve its primary purposes. The most salient consequence of institutional corruption is diminished public trust in the governance of the institution. In this paper, I describe the twin phenomena of gaming and institutional corruption - and how the former contributes to the latter, often with the support of professional advisors at law and auditing firms. I illustrate these phenomena with examples from Enron, which (apart from outright fraud) pursued one of the greatest gaming strategies of all time. I also point to the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act as an excellent source of clinical data pertaining to gaming in a more contemporary setting. I then discuss how gaming and other trust-destroying behavior have been encouraged by the short-term decision-making horizons of both corporate executives and managers of large investment funds, how those time horizons are largely driven by ways in which the performance of operating executives and investment fund managers is measured and rewarded, and how the directors of these entities become complicit in the gaming of society’s rules and the spreading of institutional corruption. I end by suggesting possible remedies for curbing the ill effects of continued gaming of society’s rules and restoring much needed public trust in the offending institutions.
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合法但腐败:赌博与私营部门的制度性腐败问题
本文描述了企业对社会规则的博弈如何导致了商业世界中的制度性腐败问题。各种形式的“赌博”包括使用技术上合法的手段来颠覆社会规则的意图,以获得对竞争对手的优势,最大化报告的收益,保持高信用评级,以优惠条件获得资本,并获得个人奖励——仅举几个可能的动机。这是商业中最具腐蚀性的制度性腐败形式之一。“制度性腐败”是指公司认可的可能合法但损害公共利益或削弱机构实现其主要目的能力的行为和关系。机构腐败最显著的后果是公众对机构治理的信任降低。在本文中,我描述了博弈和制度腐败的双重现象,以及前者如何在法律和审计事务所的专业顾问的支持下助长后者。我用安然公司(Enron)的例子来说明这些现象,安然公司(除了彻头彻尾的欺诈之外)一直奉行着最伟大的赌博策略之一。我还指出,《多德-弗兰克法案》(Dodd-Frank Act)的实施是与现代游戏相关的临床数据的绝佳来源。然后,我讨论了企业高管和大型投资基金经理的短期决策视野如何鼓励赌博和其他破坏信任的行为,这些时间视野如何在很大程度上受到衡量和奖励运营高管和投资基金经理业绩的方式的驱动,以及这些实体的董事如何成为社会规则游戏和机构腐败蔓延的同谋。最后,我提出了一些可能的补救措施,以遏制持续违反社会规则的不良影响,并恢复公众对违规机构急需的信任。
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