{"title":"Corruption and Within-Country Stereotypes","authors":"P. Buonanno, Marcello Puca, Patrizia Sbriglia","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3617590","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We conduct a hybrid experimental-observational study on college students to investigate whether the exposure to institutions of significantly heterogeneous quality affects their behavior and their stereotypes about others' behavior in a corruption experiment. The 2x2 between-subject experimental design varies: \r\n\r\n(i) the availability of information on the geographic origin of the participants; and \r\n\r\n(ii) whether participants are matched with others from the same macro-region.\r\n\r\nExperimental results show that: \r\n\r\n(i) knowing the other’s region of origin significantly increases the probability of engaging in corruption, but mostly when briber and bribee belong to different macro-regions; \r\n\r\n(ii) coming from municipalities with a lower contemporary and historical level of civic capital significantly increases the probability of engaging in corruption. \r\n\r\nOur findings suggest that the quality of institutions has a persistent effect on an individuals' internalized prosocial norms, and that these effects are evident even in a highly controlled laboratory setting.","PeriodicalId":326708,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Institutions & Corruption (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3617590","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We conduct a hybrid experimental-observational study on college students to investigate whether the exposure to institutions of significantly heterogeneous quality affects their behavior and their stereotypes about others' behavior in a corruption experiment. The 2x2 between-subject experimental design varies:
(i) the availability of information on the geographic origin of the participants; and
(ii) whether participants are matched with others from the same macro-region.
Experimental results show that:
(i) knowing the other’s region of origin significantly increases the probability of engaging in corruption, but mostly when briber and bribee belong to different macro-regions;
(ii) coming from municipalities with a lower contemporary and historical level of civic capital significantly increases the probability of engaging in corruption.
Our findings suggest that the quality of institutions has a persistent effect on an individuals' internalized prosocial norms, and that these effects are evident even in a highly controlled laboratory setting.