The Impact of Investor Protection Law on Takeovers: The Case of Leveraged Buyouts

Jerry X. Cao, Douglas J. Cumming, Jeremy C. Goh, Meijun Qian, Xiaoming Wang
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of investor protection on the value creation of LBOs. We find that target shareholders’ wealth gain is higher in countries with better investor protection. The impact of investor protection on takeover premium is larger for LBO than non-LBO transactions. We also find evidence suggesting that club LBOs are not priced lower than non-club deals after accounting for endogeneity problem. These results suggest that investor protection law may act as an important safeguard for minority shareholders in LBO transactions.
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投资者保护法对收购的影响:以杠杆收购为例
本文考察了投资者保护对杠杆收购价值创造的影响。我们发现,在投资者保护较好的国家,目标股东的财富收益更高。杠杆收购中投资者保护对收购溢价的影响大于非杠杆收购。我们也发现证据表明,在考虑内生性问题后,俱乐部杠杆收购的定价并不低于非俱乐部交易。这些结果表明,投资者保护法可以作为杠杆收购交易中中小股东的重要保障。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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Private Equity and Human Capital Risk Private Equity, Jobs, and Productivity: Reply to Ayash and Rastad A Theory of LBO Activity Based on Repeated Debt-Equity Conflicts Fare Thee Well? An Analysis of Buyout Funds' Exit Strategies The Impact of Investor Protection Law on Takeovers: The Case of Leveraged Buyouts
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